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MERCY IN AMERICAN LAW:
THE PROMISE OF THE ADOPTION OF THE OUTLOOK OF
JEWISH LAW
Yehiel Kaplan*
ABSTRACT
Under Jewish law, mercy and compassion are essential
principles to ensure the presence of a just legal system. Not only do
mercy and compassion in the law preserve traditional values of human
dignity, implementing a more compassionate legal system has
practical benefits in both the spheres of legal judgment and of legal
punishment. This article will compare the Jewish legal system’s
application of these necessary doctrines to how other modern legal
systems, including the American legal system, implement mercy and
compassion. As a result of this in-depth comparison, this article
recommends that the American legal system, and other modern legal
systems, should borrow from the Jewish legal system in order to place
a greater importance on mercy by focusing more on rehabilitation of
the offender rather than demanding strict adherence to harsh
punishment policies that only end up doing more harm than good.

*

Dr. Jur., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Associate Professor of Jewish Law
and Family Law, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa. I wish to thank the editorial
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INTRODUCTION

American law has granted less weight to mercy and
compassion and more weight to the strict path of “get-tough”
punishment and correctional policies. 1 When these policies were
adopted, they were not necessitated by concerns of deterrence.2 They
were also problematic from a constitutional standpoint, since the
Eighth Amendment prohibited cruel and unusual punishment. 3
However, the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted this
Amendment in a manner that limited the implementation of mercy in

1

See Angela J. Thielo et al., Rehabilitation in a Red State: Public Support for
Correctional Reform in Texas, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 137, 137-38 (2015)
(concerning the adoption of the get-tough correctional policy in the state of Texas).
2
See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 769-70 (2001) (“[P]eculiarly severe punishments are
reserved for offenders who have been caught committing one offense right after
another. This pattern suggests, once again, that something other than deterrence
concerns – or more precisely, optimal-deterrence concerns – are driving our
sanctions practices.”).
3
The foundation for the interpretation of the words “cruel and unusual” can be found
in the United States Supreme Court decision of Weems v. United States. 217 U.S.
349 (1910). In this case, the Court decided that ‘“[t]he punishment of fifteen years’
imprisonment was a cruel and unusual punishment, and, to the extent of the sentence,
the judgment below should be reversed on this ground.” Id. at 359. The Court
explained:
[T]he highest punishment possible for a crime which may cause the loss
of many thousands of dollars, and to prevent which the duty of the State
should be as eager as to prevent the perversion of truth in a public
document, is not greater than that which may be imposed for falsifying a
single item of a public account. And this contrast shows more than
different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater than that. It
condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a
difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under
the spirit of constitutional limitations formed to establish justice. The
State thereby suffers nothing and loses no power. The purpose of
punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not
tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the
reformation of the criminal.
....
[E]ven if the minimum penalty of cadena temporal had been imposed, it
would have been repugnant to the bill of rights. In other words, the fault
is in the law, and, as we are pointed to no other under which a sentence
can be imposed, the judgment must be reversed, with directions to dismiss
the proceedings.

Id. at 381-82.
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the American legal system. According to this interpretation, it
contained no proportionality guarantee in the sphere of criminalsentencing.4 This decision was a deviation from the policy in the prior
decision of this Court in which the ban upon cruel and unusual
punishment included a prohibition upon the implementation of a
disproportionate punishment. 5 According to the perspective of the
Supreme Court, the Constitution prevents the legislature from
authorizing particular forms or modes of punishment and, specifically,
cruel methods.6 However, it also ruled that when capital punishment
was not involved, there was no mercy requirement.7 Outside of the
capital punishment context, this requirement was not necessary, due to
the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties. 8
There were attempts to limit the negative effects of the policy
of strict punishments. Public support for correctional reform was
evident even in conservative states in the United States, such as Texas. 9
There was a shift to mercy and compassion, in certain aspects, in laws
of certain states or rulings in case-law.10 However, the basic

4

See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 963 (1991). In Harmelin, the Court held
that this punishment, while severe, might be cruel but is “not unusual in the
constitutional sense” since it has “been employed in various forms throughout” the
history of the American nation. Id. at 994-95. In Harmelin, the accused received a
life sentence without the possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine.
Id. at 961.
5
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983), overruled by Harmelin, 501 U. S.
957.
6
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284. In this case the Supreme Court held that a prison
punishment, a life sentence without parole, was cruel and unusual. The relevant
standard was the “gravity of the offence and the harshness of the penalty.” The
Eighth Amendment prohibits this disproportionate punishment, given the crime.
7
See Harmelin, 501 U. S. at n.4 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976)).
8
Id.
9
See Thielo et al., supra note 1, at 137.
10
The merciful policy was adopted in the Penry cases. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the
Supreme Court held that Mr. Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the
Eighth Amendment as a result of the fact that Texas’ special instruction questions
did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental
retardation. See 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989). In Penry v. Johnson, the Supreme Court
ruled that the judgment of the lower court was reversed in part because the jury
instructions failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding mitigating evidence. See
532 U.S. 782, 787 (2001).
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foundations of the American legal system in the sphere of judgment of
suspects and punishment of criminals did not change.11
Adoption of this strict punishment policy is not desirable.
There are many advantages to a legal system adopting a more human
perspective, as is evident in Jewish law, and considering mercy as an
essential element on the path leading to justice. 12
Mercy is required in the sphere of legal judgment. The harsh
perspectives of judges and juries who convict and impose severe
punishments, and sometimes do not consider the possibility of more
merciful alternatives, are undesirable. When the facts and evidence do
not lead to one unquestionable conclusion and legal tribunals convict
and do not attribute due weight to the benefit of doubt, injustice may
ensue. Harsh punishment policies, including imposition of the most
severe punishment (i.e., the death penalty) in unjustified
circumstances, or the imposition of punishments in a disproportionate
and excessive manner,13 are especially undesirable when the decision
to convict the accused might not be justified. Many unfortunate
mistakes of the legal system can be avoided or reduced when mercy
and kindness are important considerations and are granted the required
due weight. Controversial, strict, and severe judgments and
punishments can erode societal trust in the just outcome of the
proceedings in the legal system. This undermining of public trust is a
problematic outcome because “[w]ithout trust, our modern systems of
government, commerce, and society itself would crumble.”14
Mercy is important in the sphere of punishment as well. The
goal of the crime prevention system is the reduction of the crime rate
and deterrence of criminals. However, laws and policies of courts
designed to deter crime by focusing mainly on increasing the severity
of punishment are ineffective, partly because deterrence is the
11

See Martin H. Pritkin, Fine-Labor: The Symbiosis Between Monetary and Work
Sanctions, 81 COLO. L. REV. 343, 389 (2010). In 2010, the general trend in American
law was an insistence upon strict and severe punishment. Id.
12
See Robert L. Minser, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 131830 (2000) (concerning the advantages of adopting a more human perspective).
13
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (concerning proportionality in
punishment in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States). In this case,
the Court held that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
14
Neil Richards &Woodrow Hertzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 433 (2016).
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behavioral response to the perception of sanction threats. However,
the conclusion that crime decisions are affected by sanction risk
perceptions is not sufficient to conclude that policy can deter crime.15
Severe punishments do not achieve this goal, and many times after a
long time served in prison, convicted criminals revert to their criminal
habits. The implementation of severe punitive measures has not
reduced the crime rate in the United States. Research findings have
shown that criminal recidivism was not reduced as a result of the shift
from mercy to a stricter punishment policy in the United States.16 In
addition, the psychological benefits of mercy and compassion, when
they are justified in light of the circumstances, are evident in human
behavior.17 Harsh punishments, especially when they are not justified,
do not enhance positive human behavior.18 The shift from a greater
emphasis upon offender rehabilitation to a greater emphasis upon
punishment of offenders has not borne good fruit. The result has been
an expansion of the correctional system and an increase in the rate of

15

See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST.
199, 204 (2013).
16
See Daniel P. Mears et al., Recidivism and Time Served in Prison, 106 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 81, 83-123 (2016).
17
See id. at 93.
18
See Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and
Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004)
(concerning the psychological damage as a result of unjustified and unnecessary
convictions of criminals); see also Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Effects of
Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2005); Seri Irazola et al., Study of
Victim Experiences of Wrongful Convictions, IFC INC. 20-51 (Nov. 2013).
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incarceration in the United States. 19 This reality has imposed a
financial strain upon the public budget in the United States. 20
The main focus of this article is upon the presentation of the
better alternative. This desirable outlook is evident in many Jewish
sources. In Jewish law (Mishpat Ivri), mercy and compassion are
essential and complement strict legal doctrines. By the essential
integration of strict legal norms and mercy, a Jewish judge may arrive
at the “ultimately true” verdict (din emet la-amitto).21 Additionally,
implementing mercy in law is essential because Jewish texts require a
significant implementation of Jewish values – especially mercy and
compassion – in Jewish law. These texts further require a legal
mechanism that focuses on the maintenance and dignity of human
beings, who are created in God’s image.
I will explain how the Jewish legal system attempts to
implement these basic foundations of Judaism, in an appropriate
manner, in judging suspects and sentencing criminals after their
conviction. I will also suggest that this approach should inspire
modern legal systems, including the American legal system. Jewish
law has a much more comprehensive and demanding outlook
concerning the significance of mercy in the legal system. The
American legal system would do well to adopt the kinder and more
generous outlook of Jewish law and grant greater weight to the
significance of mercy, compassion, and mitigating circumstances in its
legal system. This shift in the American legal system should include

See ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON
STUD. 1 (8th ed. 2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative
State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1333 (2008) (regarding the
failure of the policy of severe punishment, was that these are “punitive, unforgiving
times”). In her article, Barkow offered explanations for several facts. In 2008, she
wrote there were:
19

more than two million people behind bars in the United States. Over five
million people [were] on probation or some other form of supervised
release. Prisoners [were] serving ever-longer sentences. Presidential and
gubernatorial grants of clemency [were] rare events. The use of jury
nullifications to check harsh or overbroad laws was viewed by judges and
other legal elites with suspicion.

Id.; see also Michael Welch, Ironies of American Imprisonment, in HANDBOOK ON
PRISONS 359 (Yvonne Jewkes et al., eds., 2d ed. 2016).
20
See United States v. Simmons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
21
See discussion infra Part III(A) (concerning the ultimate truth in Jewish law).
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a return to emphasis upon the rehabilitation of offenders.22 The
outcome of this policy should be positive for all members of society. 23
Indeed, there are scholars who claim that the emphasis upon
mercy in punishment, including the perspective presented in the
Jewish texts, is incompatible with the concept of retributive justice and
the principle of equality in law. They claim that the implementation
of mercy in the legal system can lead to dangerous offenders, who are
morally accountable, escaping appropriate punishment. 24 They are
also opposed to granting significance, in criminal law, to certain
circumstances that might justify the mitigation of the punishment in
courts, such as the prisoner’s age or the suffering of his or her family.25
They claim certain factors that the legal system defines as mitigating
factors – such as the offender’s belief that he or she was acting in
justified circumstances, including justified civil disobedience – are
irrelevant to the penal process and an obstacle for a legal system when
it attempts to achieve the goal of retribution in an effective manner. 26
However, Kathleen Dean Moore, who justifies the institution of
pardons based on a retributive conception of justice, nevertheless
claims that the legal system should grant pardons not only for false
convictions and convictions of the insane. 27 It should also grant

22

See John Steer & Paula K. Biderman, Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
on the President’s Power to Commute Sentences, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 154, 156
(2001) (“A post-sentencing development that historically has provided a basis for
altering the punishment imposed is recognition of extraordinary defendant initiatives
that convincingly demonstrate rehabilitation. Today, however, a defendant’s
opportunity to shorten a prison sentence through post-sentence rehabilitative conduct
is quite limited. With its abolition of parole, restrictions on post-sentence motions
for a reduced sentence under Rule 35, and tight limits on good-time credits to reduce
the term of imprisonment required to be served, the [Sentencing Reform Act] clearly
shifted from a rehabilitation philosophy (insofar as a purpose of imprisonment) to an
approach emphasizing certainty of punishment and other sentencing purposes.”).
23
See Hannah Fuetsch, The Progressive Programming Facility: A Rehabilitative,
Cost-Effective Solution to California’s Prison Problem, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 449, 44963 (2017) (concerning the benefits of rehabilitation for criminals and all members of
society).
24
See Daniel Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1453-73 (2004).
25
Id. at 1436.
26
See id. at 1443 n.70.
27
See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 97-98 (1989); see also Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy,
82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1421-23 (2004) (concerning the positive effect of mercy in
capital punishment cases).
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pardons to reduce the sentences of criminals who were treated too
harshly. According to her, a policy that grants due weight to mercy
for good and sufficient reasons should be part of the path leading to
true justice in the legal system. 28
Several aspects of adopting an approach that favors mercy in
the Jewish legal system, especially the significance of mercy in the
Bible and in the writing of prominent rabbis in ancient times, the
medieval period, and the twentieth century, are presented in this
article.29 Additionally, interpretations of many sources pertaining to
mercy in Jewish law are presented. There is also a focus upon the
gradual development of Jewish law pertaining to the significance of
mercy. The message broadcast by these Jewish sources, whereby
mercy has an essential role in the legal system, will be emphasized.
The article presents a comprehensive outlook that stems from a
number of important Jewish sources pertaining to mercy. The legal
principles in these texts, and their interpretation and analysis, are
applicable in many spheres of Jewish law. They lead one modern
Israeli legal scholar to the conclusion that “Jewish law is
comprehensive . . . ‘It includes also charity, morality, compromise,
education, and in this legal system, compromise is more dominant than
strict law and the activity beyond the strict latter of law is
preferable.’”30
II.

MAJOR TRENDS IN AMERICAN LAW

One approach in American criminal law is to grant less weight
to mercy and a lenient judgment, while giving greater weight to a strict
28

Id.
Many new sources and aspects of mercy in Judaism are presented in this article.
There are also other presentations regarding the significance of mercy in Jewish law
in English. See Samuel J. Levine, Looking Beyond the Mercy/Justice Dichotomy:
Reflections on the Complementary Roles of Mercy and Justice in Jewish Law and
Tradition, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 455, 455-71 (2006); see also Samuel J. Levine,
Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its Application to the American Legal
System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1037, 1037-53 (1998)
(presenting the outlook in certain sources in Jewish law pertaining to capital
punishment); Daniel A. Rudolph, The Misguided Reliance in American
Jurisprudence on Jewish Law to Support the Moral Legitimacy of Capital
Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437, 437-62 (1996).
30
Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Tarbut Shel Mishpat - Al Meoravut Shiputit, Akhifat Hok veHatma’at Arakhim, 17 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 689, 692-93 (1993).
29
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legal policy and severe punishments. I will focus upon the effect of
this approach in two spheres in American law: the policy pertaining to
three-strikes laws and the policy pertaining to capital punishment.
A.

Three-Strikes Laws

Between 1993 and 1997, twenty-six states and the Federal
Government enacted three-strikes laws.31 California adopted a threestrikes law, reflecting a shift in its sentencing policies regarding the
incapacitation and deterrence of repeat offenders. The California
three-strikes law was an attempt “to increase the prison terms of repeat
felons.”32 Under the three-strikes law there was a “go-tough” policy,
even concerning defendants serving a life sentence, at the stage in
which they become eligible for parole. 33 The purpose of this
legislation was “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater
punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously
convicted of serious and/or violent felony offences.” 34
The three-strikes laws were controversial. Critics doubted the
wisdom of these laws, their cost-efficiency and their effectiveness, and
claimed they do not achieve the goals of the law enforcement system
in the United States. 35 In addition, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
the imposition of “cruel and unusual” punishment prohibits “excessive

James Austin et al., Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Review of State Legislation,
NAT.
INST.
JUST.
1
(Sept.
1997),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/181297.pdf.
32
People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
33
Under the three-strikes law:
31

[defendants] become eligible for parole on a date calculated by a reference
to a “minimum term,” which is the greater of (a) three times the term
otherwise provided for the current conviction, (b) 25 years, or (c) the term
determined by the court pursuant to § 1170 for the underlying conviction,
including any enhancements.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16 (2003) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §
667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)(iii) (West Supp. 2002)).
34
Id. at 47 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE. § 667(b) (West 1999)). “California . . . [was]
the second state to enact a three-strikes law. In November 1993, the voters of
Washington State approved . . . [a] three-strikes law.” Id. at 16.
35
See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 395, 423 (1997); Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime,
Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of the Case Against California’s Three Strikes
Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 45-46 (2000).
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sanctions.”36 Faithful to the requirements stemming from this
Amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution directs
judges to apply their best judgment in determining the proportionality
of fines and other forms of punishment, including the imposition of a
death sentence. 37 However, the path of mercy was not adopted when
the California Court of Appeals38 and the Supreme Court rejected
Ewing’s claim that his sentence, under the three-strikes law of the state
of California, was grossly disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment.39
The Supreme Court ruled that “[t]he Eighth
Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, contains a
‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital
sentences.’”40 It also stressed that three-strikes laws achieve an
important goal: they deter repeat offenders. 41
B.

Capital Punishment

Capital punishment is controversial, and its opponents claim it
is cruel, inhumane, and degrading. 42 In the United States, the methods
of legal execution are cruel: death by electrocution, firing squad, lethal
gas, hanging, and lethal injection. 43 Moreover, this punishment is
irreversible. There is no option of correcting a mistake of the legal
system after the execution. The critics claim that the imposition of this
punishment is a severe violation of human rights. Specifically, the

36

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977); United States v. Bajakajian, 542 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1998).
38
See People v. Ewing, No. B143745, 2001 WL 1840666, at *1, *4 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 25, 2001) (relying on Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
39
See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
40
Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part)). See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910); see
also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1992) (concerning the application
of the Eighth Amendment to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment).
41
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27.
42
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (concerning the action
of the courts in the United States in an attempt to combat illegal cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment of human beings); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D.
Fla. 1993).
43
See Kristina E. Beard, Five Under the Eighth: Methodology Review and the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 460-65 (1997).
37
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right to life is an important right, and imposition of this punishment is
a violation of this right, sometimes unnecessarily. 44
Advocates of the death penalty claim it is necessary in order to
combat crime in an effective manner, deterring potential criminals and
ensuring that convicted criminals do not commit additional crimes. 45
However, the findings of one study, based upon analysis of
international data, showed that there were declining murder rates after
the abolition of the death penalty in certain countries.46 The death
penalty abolition correlated on average with a decline in murder rates in
eleven countries for which data was available. Death penalty advocates’
fears that the state relinquishing the ultimate punishment will encourage
potentially dangerous criminals to commit crimes, or at least weaken
deterrence, have proven unfounded in light of this evidence.47
Therefore, those opposed to the death penalty claim that there should
be a total abolition of capital punishment in the United States. They
sometimes stress that it was abolished in Germany, Austria and Italy
right after World War II. Indeed, the European Union will not admit
a country with a death penalty, since Article Two of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits the use of capital
punishment.48 The Council of Europe, too, conditions membership,
inter alia, upon abolition of the death penalty, and none of its member
states has carried out an execution since 1997. This pattern is
dominant in Europe.49
44

See N.B. Smith, The Death Penalty as an Unconstitutional Deprivation of Life and
the Right to Privacy, 25 B.C. L. REV. 743, 745-46, 748-50 (1984); Kevin M. Barry,
The Death Penalty and the Fundamental Right to Life, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 15451603 (2019).
45
Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics
Approach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death
Penalty More Than Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 53-106 (2006); Robert Blecker,
Current Issues in Public Policy: But Did They Listen? The New Jersey Death
Commission’s Exercise in Abolitionism: A Detailed Reply, 5 R UTGERS J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 9, 20-21(2007).
46
What Happens to Murder Rates when the Death Penalty is Scrapped? A Look at
Eleven Countries Might Surprise You, ABDORRAHMAN BOROUMAND CTR. (Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.iranrights.org/library/document/3501.
47
Id.
48
See 2000 J.O. (C 364) 9.
49
See Peter Hodgkinson, The Twenty-Third Annual Law Review Symposium–The
Ultimate Penalty: A Multifarious Look at Capital Punishment: Europe–A Death
Penalty Free Zone: Commentary and Critique of Abolitionist Strategies, 26 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 529, 625-28 (2000).
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In the United States, the death penalty has not been abolished,
although its scope has been limited. There was hope it might be
abolished in 1972 when the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,50
ruled that the Eighth Amendment imposed significant restraints on the
imposition of the death penalty. 51 It ruled that the death penalty, if not
implemented in the appropriate manner, could be a violation of the
prohibition in the U.S. Constitution. The Court, in the majority
opinion, declared that the “imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”52 Thus the
decision in that case effectively abolished the death penalty in the
United States.53 For the first time in the history of the United States,
there was an understanding, as a result of this decision, that it was
illegal to execute a defendant. The decision in the Furman case caused
all death sentences pending at that time to be commuted to life
imprisonment.54 It also forced the states and the U.S. Congress to
rethink the rules in the state and federal statutes enabling the
imposition of capital punishment, in an attempt to ensure that the death
penalty would be administered in an appropriate manner.55 However,
the ruling in Furman was concerned largely with the form in which the
death penalty in the United States was carried out in certain cases,
rather than with the substantive issue of whether this cruel and
irreversible punishment was an appropriate method of punishment.
The decision of the Court related to the lack of procedural safeguards
and did not state that in all cases, this punishment was a violation of
the rule in the U.S. Constitution.

50

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See id. at 239-40.
52
Id.
53
See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147,
152-53 n.15 (1998) (“Chief Justice Burger predicted privately that there would never
be another execution in the United States” (quoting BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 259 (1979))).
54
See Michael Mello, “In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law”: Diary
of A Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983-1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583, 665 (2000).
55
See Rory K. Little, Forward: The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 37778 (1999).
51
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Later, in Gregg v. Georgia,56 the United States Supreme Court
adopted a more accepting approach toward the implementation of the
death penalty. The Court described the two main features that were
required in capital sentencing procedures in order to avoid cruel and
unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
However, acceptance of imposition of the death penalty in the United
States was reaffirmed: in particular, Mr. Gregg’s death sentence was
upheld.57 The Supreme Court ruled that imposition of the death
penalty in this case was not a violation of the rule in the Constitution
so long as the procedures involved in the execution were not a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 58 This decision essentially ended
Furman’s moratorium on the death penalty. In the aftermath of the
Gregg case, the death penalty was imposed frequently in the United
States.59
During this period, an approach affording weight to mercy was
also sometimes evident in certain aspects pertaining to capital
punishment, in state legislation in the United States or in case law. The
new outlook was especially evident in several rulings of the Supreme
Court of the United States that limited the imposition of this
punishment in certain spheres.
The Supreme Court ruled that “a sentence of death was grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape,” and
therefore, in these circumstances, it was a “cruel and unusual”

56

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 154.
58
Id. at 187.
59
See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). Utah was the first state that
resumed the use of capital punishment after the 1967-1976 national moratorium on
capital punishment, in 1977. Gary Gilmore was
57

[an] American murderer whose execution by the state of Utah in 1977
ended a de facto nationwide moratorium on capital punishment that had
lasted nearly 10 years.
....
Gilmore’s death did not bring on an immediate wave of executions. By
the end of 1982, only five more criminals – three of whom, like Gilmore,
had voluntarily given up the appeal process – had been put to death. But
the pace subsequently quickened: in the first 40 years after Gilmore’s
death, 1,443 convicts were executed in the United States.

See Robert Lewis, Gary Gilmore, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Gary-Gilmore.
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punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 60 The Court also
held that the rule pertaining to a “cruel and unusual” punishment
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child in
cases in which the victim did not die and death was not intended.61
In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that capital
punishment was not appropriate for a defendant who was a participant
in a robbery in which his codefendant killed two victims.62 There was
no evidence that the defendant either killed or intended to kill the
victims, or that he intended that deadly force be used. The Supreme
Court stated that allowing capital punishment in these circumstances
was a violation of the rule in the Eighth Amendment, and it reversed
and remanded the defendant’s death sentence. 63
In other cases, the Supreme Court ruled, as a result of a
merciful interpretation of the rules in the Constitution pertaining to
harsh punishment, that capital punishment was not appropriate for
criminals with developmental disabilities. At the first stage, the
Supreme Court ruled that execution of criminals with developmental
disabilities is not cruel and unusual punishment. 64 However, in the
Atkins case it ruled that the death penalty for criminals with
developmental disabilities is cruel and unusual punishment which
violates the Eighth Amendment ban on such punishment. 65
Mercy is evident also in the context of the death penalty for
juvenile murderers in the Thompson case.66 The merciful outlook in
Thompson was expanded in the decision of the Supreme Court
concerning death sentences for juveniles in the case of Roper v.
Simmons,67 where the Court ruled that the Constitution prohibited the
execution of juveniles who were under the age of eighteen when they
committed a murder.68

See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). “We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability’ . . . is an
excessive penalty for the rapist.” Id. at 598.
61
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412 (2008).
62
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
63
Id.
64
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
65
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
66
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
67
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
68
See id. at 562.
60
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The policy of merciful punishment for juvenile offenders was
evident also in the sphere of the sentence of life without parole. At the
first stage, the Supreme Court prohibited the sentence of life without
parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders.69 Eventually it prohibited
mandatory sentences to life without parole for juveniles, regardless of
the crime they committed.70
In addition, the Supreme Court removed limitations that had
been imposed upon the presentation of mitigating evidence, or upon
the best defense, in capital punishment cases. In Lockett v. Ohio,71 the
Court ruled that the death penalty statute was unconstitutional when a
court imposed mandatory capital punishment based on three narrowlydrawn mitigating factors, and did not permit individualized
consideration of a wider range of mitigating circumstances. The Court
stated that the Constitution requires, in all but the rarest cases, that
those who impose a sentence should consider all mitigating factors
surrounding the accused before they reach the decision that the penalty
should be death.72
In another case, a criminal was convicted and sentenced to
death. The Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion of evidence
pertaining to the guilt of a third party in this case was unlawful.73 In a
criminal trial, a conviction based on the strength of the prosecution’s
case with little or no examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses or the reliability of its evidence violated the constitutional
right of a criminal defendant to have a meaningful opportunity to
present a defense.74 A court could not exclude evidence presented by
a criminal defendant to the effect that a third party committed the crime
simply because the prosecution had a strong case. 75 In another capital
punishment case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court, ruling that when the only aggravating factor was the
particularly egregious (“outrageously or wantonly vile”) nature of the

69

See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
71
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
72
See id. at 604-05. The issue facing the Supreme Court in the Lockett case was
whether the Ohio death penalty scheme, where the jury could only consider three
mitigating factors, violated Lockett’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel
and unusual punishment. See id. The Court ruled that it did. Id.
73
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).
74
See id.
75
Id. at 330-31.
70
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murder, the death sentence could not be imposed, since that factor did
not help avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty on the part of
judges or juries.76
The Supreme Court also ruled that the aggravating factor
necessary under Arizona law to impose a death sentence must be
determined by a jury, not a judge. 77 Since the death penalty was not
possible without the finding of aggravating factors, a jury had to
determine that those factors are present unless the defendant waives
the right to a jury trial.78 The defendant should be able to exercise his
right under the Sixth Amendment to benefit from the advantages of a
jury trial. A jury must evaluate all facts essential to the imposition of
a death penalty, including aggravating sentencing factors, before
rendering a decision as to whether the death sentence is appropriate.79
This Amendment requires that the jury ascertain, in an independent
act, the presence of the aggravating factors necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty. The Court determined that if a
particular fact exposed the defendant to a greater punishment, the jury
should find it.80
The willingness to consider the adoption of the path of mercy
concerning the implementation of capital punishment in the United
States in a more significant manner was evident in the minority
opinions of Jewish justices in the Supreme Court of the United States.
In recent years, in his minority opinion in Glossip v. Gross,81 in which
he was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer focused upon the
evidence that the administration of the death penalty in the United
States was flawed and fraught with human risk.82 His dissenting
opinion was an attempt to implement a mild form of mercy in capital
punishment cases. Although Justice Breyer did not reach the general
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty was a violation of
the Constitution, he laid the foundation for this conclusion. He noted
that when the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in 1976 in

76

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420 (1980).
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002).
78
Id. at 602.
79
See id. at 611-13 (Scalia, J. & Thomas, J., concurring).
80
Id.
81
Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015).
82
See id. at 908-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77
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Gregg and accompanying decisions,83 it did so on the assumption that
the statutes in the United States “contain safeguards sufficient to
ensure that the penalty would be applied reliably . . . .”84 However,
Justice Breyer stated that since then, circumstances have changed. 85
Administration of the death penalty at this time suffered from
fundamental constitutional defects:
(1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application,
and (3) unconscionably long delays that undermine the
death penalty’s penological purpose. Perhaps as a
result, (4) most places within the United States have
abandoned” the use of capital punishment. 86 This led
to his conclusion that “those changes, taken together
with my own 20 years of experience on this Court, lead
me to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself,
now likely constitutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and
unusual punishment.’”87
The total shift towards mercy in this sphere – the abolishing of
all forms of capital punishment – is not the general rule in the United
States at present. The decisions of the Supreme Court that displayed
mercy were the outcome of the implementation of specific restrictions
engendered by rules in the Constitution, especially the Eighth
Amendment. The interpretation of this Amendment led to the
conclusion that “the death penalty is reserved only for the most
culpable defendants committing the most serious offences.” 88
However, under this interpretation, the death penalty was not totally
abolished. In 2020, the United States is the only Western country at
present that has the death penalty.89 Capital punishment is currently

83

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 24752 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976).
84
Glossip, 576 U.S. at 908.
85
See id. at 908-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 909-10.
87
Id. at 909.
88
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012).
89
Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (2021), https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-wedo/death-penalty.
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authorized in twenty-seven states, by the federal government and the
U.S. military.90
Ultimately, the Court ruled to prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders in an attempt to comply with
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 91
However, this resulted in the Court adopting an alternative
punishment, which is also cruel and unusual. Life without parole
sentences replaced executions of juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders. This move does not constitute the adoption of the path of
mercy, and it could also be a violation of the obligation to act in a
manner which is not “cruel and unusual” in the sphere of punishment. 92
For juveniles, the severe, unmerciful punishment of life without parole
is a sentence that, not unlike capital punishment, imposes a “terminal,
unchangeable, once-and-for-all judgment upon the whole life of a
human being and declares that a human being is forever unfit to be a
part of civil society.”93
III.

JEWISH LAW

Mercy is an essential element and a compelling factor in the
process of judging the acts of another individual in Judaism and Jewish
law. The outlook of mercy is essential also to the path that could lead
to a conviction in a Jewish court. Conviction at the end of the process
of judgment should be the outcome only of a firm conclusion that an
individual acted in a manner that was a violation of the principles of
Jewish law. The Creator of the World directed us to grant due weight
to mercy and compassion also in this sphere. Moreover, mercy is an

States and Capital Punishment, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (Aug. 11, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty.aspx.
91
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (concerning criminals with
developmental disabilities and the limitation of the implementation of the death
penalty); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562 (2005) (deciding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders).
92
See Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons
for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 9, 10 (2008) (concerning the constitutional criticism of this harsh
punishment).
93
Brief for Petitioner at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 560 U.S. 181 (2010) (No. 08-7621);
Michelle Marquis, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both Juveniles
and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 266-67 (2011).
90
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important and essential consideration at the stage of evaluating the
appropriate punishment of an individual who has been convicted.
A.

Goal of the Jewish Legal System – The Ultimate
Truth

There are two levels of truth in Jewish jurisprudence. The
regular truth, emet in Hebrew, and din emet la’amito in Hebrew
(literally: the law that is the truth in its true form), which, as this
concept has been understood in Jewish sources, should be translated
as “the ultimate truth.” The definition of the Jewish ultimate legal truth
and the method of implementation of the rules guiding rabbis and
Jewish courts in this sphere are important when rabbis or Jewish courts
evaluate a Jew’s acts. This evaluation should stem from the
comprehension that the deep and more significant legal desideratum is
to do what is necessary in light of the ultimate truth – din emet
la’amito. This should be the aim of the decision-making process of
rabbis, at the stage of judgment, and of the rulings of the Jewish court
(Beit Din), at the stage of punishment.
In Jewish sources, one finds different interpretations of the
concept din emet la’amito. I will present all the interpretations but will
focus in particular on one of the major trends in Jewish law that grants
due weight to mercy. According to this interpretation, din emet
la’amito is achieved through a process that determines the merciful
and compassionate essence of each legal decision. Implementation of
this approach should lead to the adoption of the legal perspective
which is “outside the [strict] letter of the law,” in the appropriate
circumstances.94
According to this perspective, mercy is an essential element in
the process of Jewish judgment and punishment. Adoption of the more
lenient and generous outlook of mercy, “outside the letter of the law,”
at the appropriate time and place, should lead to just judgments and
punishments of Jewish courts, or of rabbis, in their halakhic rulings.
In this desirable process, the legal decision is not only the outcome of
the evaluation of the case in light of the principles of the Jewish legal
system pertaining to a certain legal dilemma, and their correct
implementation. The legal decision-making process should also be an

94

See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b (concerning the directive to adopt this
perspective in Jewish law).
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expression of the attempt to do what is correct and necessary in light
of Jewish values. The Jewish judge and rabbi should evaluate, in each
case, what they should do to implement these values, including mercy.
Their legal decision-making policy, in the sphere of punishment as
well, should aspire to be merciful in appropriate circumstances. They
should search for the correct conclusion after evaluating all the facts,
rules of Jewish law, and circumstances, and attempt to implement the
values of Judaism in this process. Jewish judges and rabbis should
take seriously their obligation to act in the image of the Creator of the
World and in accordance with what is required by the Lord from all
Jews. Jewish judges and rabbis who strive to act in the image of the
Lord understand that the implementation of Jewish values is necessary
in the process of application of the existing rules in every case that they
analyze or adjudicate. In the ideal process, the Jewish court and the
rabbi, in addition to examining all the important facts and legal
arguments in the matter at hand in light of the principles of Jewish law,
will endeavor to apply the required Jewish values in the Jewish legal
arena to the greatest extent possible. They should act, when necessary,
beyond the letter of the strict and uncompromising law in a merciful
and compassionate manner. They should also grant due weight to the
just outcome, fairness and impartiality, avoid bias, adopt the path of
pleasantness and peace and enhance compromise and peace in the
world.
When Jewish courts or rabbis attempt to implement Jewish
values and determine what is din emet la’amito and adopt the approach
that grants due weight to Jewish values in their judgments and rulings,
mitigating circumstances are important, and occasionally such
mitigating circumstances justify acting in a kind and compassionate
manner. The Jewish court should grant due weight to these special
circumstances and act in a milder and more generous manner in its
decisions, when appropriate.
i.

Development of the Principles of Jewish Law:
Biblical, Tannaitic, and Amoraic Law

Truth in law is important in the Bible. In biblical law, Jewish
judges should be individuals who are guided by an aspiration to
achieve truth in their proceedings and decisions. 95 The ideal law in the
95

Exodus 18, 21.
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Bible is law that grants significant weight to the truth. At the Biblical
stage of the development of Jewish law, there is a requirement that the
goal of the judge and legal system be that the outcome of their activity
will be the truth.96
At the next stage of the development of Jewish law, i.e., the
Tannaitic and Amoraic period, an important goal of the judge and the
legal system is the ultimate truth (din emet la’amito in Hebrew, lit. true
law of truth).97 The state of mind required when Jewish courts or
rabbis set goals for their judicial activity, including their activity when
they determine the fate of another individual, should be a sincere and
serious attempt to do what they can to achieve not only mere truth, but
the ultimate truth (din emet la’amito). In sources from the Tannaitic
and Amoraic period, the ancient Jewish Sages encouraged the Jewish
judge to adopt the path leading to the ultimate truth in his judgment.
They praised the Jewish judge who sought to achieve the ultimate truth
and stated that if he acts in this desirable manner for “even one hour,”
he becomes a partner of the Creator of the World in the important
mission of the creation of the world.98 The aspiration to achieve the
ultimate truth in law and to act in a merciful and compassionate mode
when the circumstances justify the adoption of this approach should
also lead to the granting of due weight to mitigating circumstances.
Implementation of the values of Judaism, in the appropriate
circumstances, is possible when the judgment in Jewish law is the
outcome of an evaluation of whether mercy is necessary in a certain
case, in light of the specific circumstances.
ii.

Development of the Principles of Jewish Law:
Medieval Jewish Literature

In medieval Jewish literature there are several explanations of
din emet la’amito – the goal of the activity of a Jewish court and the
decision-making process of rabbis. In interpreting the statements and

96

Ezekiel 18:8.
See Menachem Elon, Truth, Peace, and Conciliation: The Pillars of Law and
Society, 14 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 269, 272 n.13 (1998). Professor Elon stressed that
there are doubts if “ultimate truth” is the goal of the legal system in tannaitic sources.
Id. However, those sources include Mishnah Peah 8:9, which mentioned that the
goal of the judgment is to discover the ultimate truth. Id.
98
See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a; Eruvin 54b; Megilah 15b; Chagigah 14b;
Bava Batra 8b; Sanhedrin 7a, 111b.
97
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debate in texts of the ancient Sages concerning din emet la’amito,
many medieval commentators explained that the requirement to
achieve the ultimate truth is the obligation to avoid decisions that are
a result of mistakes in the evaluation of facts or circumstances.
According to this definition, the ultimate truth in Jewish law is the
outcome of an attempt to determine all the relevant true facts and
circumstances in a particular matter. 99 When a Jewish judge or rabbi
is not sure of the true relevant facts, especially when they have doubts
about the conviction of a suspect in a criminal trial, they should
investigate the matter and attempt to reach a decision after determining
the true relevant facts. Their investigation should be careful and
sensitive and as a result their determination of the true facts should
lead to the true verdict. Particularly when Jewish authorities suspect
that their decision in a case might be tainted as a result of perjury, their
decision should be made only after fulfillment of the obligation to
ensure a comprehensive investigation of the facts and details relevant
to the case. The Spanish Jewish scholar, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham
Aderet, stressed the Jewish court that seeks to implement the ultimate
truth should take care to investigate the matter thoroughly and examine
all the relevant facts.100
At times, the Jewish medieval scholars required that this
investigation also be conducted outside the courtroom when it was
necessary in order to enable a litigant to prove his claims and
determine the relevant facts precisely so as to avoid unfortunate
mistakes of the legal system. The activity conducted outside the
courtroom could be an announcement in the synagogue that any person
who had information that could be helpful for the Jewish judge or a
scholar in a certain case should come forward and testify about the
facts and details. The additional determination of what is true and what
is not, which arises from this testimony, assists those attempting to
arrive at din emet la’amito. Such an announcement is essential when
further investigation regarding these facts and details could be
critical.101 Measures to avoid a tainted decision of a Jewish judge or
rabbi, who is acting in light of his obligation to implement law that is

99

For more about this legal policy in the medieval responsa literature, see Responsa
of Rambam 427; Responsa of Rashba 3:88, 186; Responsa of Ritva 97, 208;
Responsa of Rashbash 229, 411.
100
See Responsa of Rashba 3:92.
101
See Responsa of the Sages of Provence 1:60.
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the ultimate truth, sometimes include the examination and crossexamination of witnesses, so that the final conclusion and verdict will
be din emet la’amito.102
The fifteenth century Jewish law scholar, Rabbi Joseph Colon,
wrote that the objective of determining din emet la’amito puts the
responsibility upon the Jewish judge and rabbi to determine the truth
by means of a thorough investigation of the facts and consideration of
the circumstances in light of the arguments of the litigants. 103 In
addition, he wrote that the reasoning of the Jewish court should reflect
an analysis of all relevant facts and details leading to the goal: the
ultimate truth. According to his perspective, the requirement to
achieve the goal of din emet la’amito imposes upon the Jewish courts
and rabbi, who are expected to reach a conclusion concerning a certain
matter, especially when there are doubts, the obligation to do
everything they can in order to find out the truth. 104 Mercy is the
outcome of uncertainty about this truth. They should determine the
true convicting facts only after they are sure they can reach a solid
conclusion about a conviction, or an obligation in civil matters. They
should grant the Jewish individual the right to receive a merciful
verdict when the fact-finding process leads to the conclusion that he
can enjoy the benefit of doubt.
Furthermore, some Jewish law scholars in the Middle Ages
wrote that the objective of achieving the ultimate truth in the legal
system will be achieved when a Jewish court or rabbi attributes
appropriate importance to the combined application of the values of
Judaism and the principles of Jewish law in the legal process and in
their judgments. The implementation of these values is necessary to
allow, not only for a review of all relevant factors, but also for a
significant dialogue between values and law that should ultimately
lead to the ultimate truth. There were rabbis who explained that, when
Jewish courts and rabbis attempt to ensure that their rulings are not
only true but also the ultimate truth, they must focus on the need to
adopt a pattern of action that is beyond the letter of law in appropriate
See Tosafot, Shabbat 10a, s.v. din emet la’amito; Tosafot, Bava Batra 8b, s.v. din
emet la’amito.
103
See Responsa of Rabbi Joseph Colon 118 (Jerusalem 5748); see also RABBI
YAACOV BEN ASHER, SEFER HATURIM (TUR), HOSHEN MISHPAT ch. 75 (Jerusalem
1975). The basis of this policy was the rule in the codification of Jewish Law of
Rabbi Yaacov ben Asher. Id.
104
Id.
102
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circumstances. When the object is the implementation of the ultimate
truth, in light of what is required at a certain time and place, the Jewish
judges and rabbis should grant priority, in the appropriate
circumstances, to a decision-making process that is beyond the letter
of the law (which is the ultimate truth). Adoption of this outlook is
better than the implementation of a decision-making process that is
guided only by strict and formal legal doctrines.
In this spirit, Jewish scholars in the Middle Ages wrote that,
since the object of a Jewish court or rabbi is a legal decision that is the
ultimate truth, he should attempt to find out, in the specific case and
where appropriate, how he can ameliorate the plight of an individual,
deviate from the general strict rules, and choose the path that is
“straighter,” that is beyond the strict letter of the law. The severe
principles of strict Jewish law, which are only one part of Jewish law
– its “general assumptions” – should be mitigated.
This is the view of the Jewish medieval scholar, Rabbi Yitzhak
Aramah. He stressed that there is a correct approach when a Jewish
court or rabbi attempts to act in light of the ultimate truth. When the
Jewish decision-making process is an attempt to achieve the ultimate
truth, rabbis and Jewish courts should deviate from the strict general
norms of the legal system and adopt the “straighter” path.105 The
Jewish court or rabbi should understand that in certain circumstances,
they are required to deviate from the regular strict norms and demands
of the legal system, and rule in a manner that is appropriate in light of
the specific and special circumstances of each case. When they choose
this path and “straighten” the severity of regular law, the ultimate truth
ensues. Jewish judges who seek to apply the approach of the ultimate
truth prefer mercy and compassion, which are significant factors in
their legal analysis. This preference prevents the unnecessary and
undesirable harsh fate of individuals that might ensue when the
dominant standard in the legal system is the strict approach of “let the
law cut through the mountain.”106 Rabbi Aramah stressed that when

105

See Yitzhak Aramah, Akedat Yitzhak, Shemot, Yitro, ch. 43.
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b. The Sages there stressed that this is the
approach attributed to Moses, but according to the alternative mild perspective – that
of compromise – attributed to Aaron, the better legal policy combines the values of
mercy and peace in the legal evaluation. They mentioned the strict standard, of no
compromise and no peace: “Let the law cut through the mountain,” attributed to
Moses and not to his brother, Aaron. The Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b states:
106
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the legal system chooses this undesirable path and is willing to achieve
its objectives in a manner that is not appropriate, the ultimate goal of
justice in law is not achieved. Strict law is implemented, and the
outcome for human beings is cruel and non-proportional.107
Rabbi Aramah wrote: “[I]ndeed, rabbinical court judges who
always judge according to the general assumptions, judge in an attempt
to implement the true law (they apply the basic foundation of law:
‘truth’). However, they are the destroyers of the world (because they
do not also apply the significant additional foundation of ‘ultimate
truth’).” 108 These judges granted significant weight to the general
truth and did not attempt to “straighten” it in circumstances that
justified deviation from the strict law (they did not invoke the
perspective of “ultimate truth” in their legal activity). They adopted
the strict policy: “Let the law cut through the mountain.” 109 The
Psalmist said: “They shall not know, nor shall they understand in the
darkness they shall walk, all the institutions of the earth shall be
overthrown.”110 This statement is applicable concerning the most
damaging and corrupt group of Jewish judges. 111
A similar point of view is reflected in the writings of the Jewish
scholar and Bible commentator, Rabbi Don Yitzhak Abravanel. 112 He

Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Jose the Galilean says: It is forbidden to
mediate a dispute, and he who mediates thus offends, and whoever praises
such a mediator [boze’a] is cursing God . . . . But let the law drill through
the mountain, for it is written: For the judgment is God’s. And so, Moses
would say . . . Aaron, however, loved peace and pursued peace and made
peace between man and man, as it is written: “The law of truth was in his
mouth. Unrighteousness was not found in his lips, he walked with Me in
peace and uprightness and did turn many away from iniquity.”

Id.
107

See supra note 105.
At this point rabbi Aramah quotes from Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b.
In this text, the Sages state that in the generation of the destruction of the Temple the
judges implemented the strict law (lit. the law of the Torah) and did not judge
according to the principles that are lifnim mi-shurat ha-din (“beyond the letter of the
law”).
109
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b.
110
Psalms 82:5.
111
Yitzhak Aramah, Akedat Yitzhak, Shemot, Yitro, ch. 43.
112
See RABBI YITZHAK ABRAVANEL, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, DEUTERONOMY
17:11, s.v. ve’omer shehineh beheter hasafek hashishi. He wrote:
108

[The Temple in] Jerusalem was destroyed because the judges at that time
implemented only the law of the Torah (lit. biblical law). They
implemented the general rules of truth (not ultimate truth) but would not
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explained that the special authority of the Jewish court to act outside
the boundaries of law that is implemented in regular circumstances
when necessary in order to act in light of special needs of society, can
be exercised both when a more strict and severe law is necessary and
also when a milder policy of mitigation and mercy is necessary.
Exercise of this authority may also sometimes be necessary in order to
rectify the severe result when acting in a lenient manner is preferable.
When the Jewish court or rabbi believes, in a particular case, that his
decision should be kind and lenient, he should deviate from the regular
rules and prefer the lenient policy of the path of kindness and mercy,
in order to achieve the ultimate truth in the decision. In these
circumstances, it is necessary to reject the strict policy: “let the law cut
through the mountain.”113 There is an obligation to soften the severity
of the law that is implemented in regular circumstances, mitigate it,
adopt rules and policies that are irregular and unique and to act beyond
the strict and rigid law.
Rabbi Yitzhak Aramah and Rabbi Don Yitzhak Abravanel
stressed that truth and mercy together lead to the just outcome. The
ultimate truth is the outcome of an attempt to determine the
accommodating, specific, and unique circumstances, including the
mitigating circumstances that may lead to the justified implementation
of the path of mercy in jurisprudence. The “pure heart” of mercy and
compassion is sometimes essential when the Jewish legal system
attempts to reach the just outcome. 114
This approach is probably an outcome of the influence of the
perspective in Aristotle’s philosophical writings in the writings of

straighten the law when it was necessary at a certain time. Their policy
was: ‘let the law cut through the mountain’ . . . . When their rulings were
guided by the limited perspective of the general principles of law their
decisions would not be straight and appropriate [in light of the required
values that should be implemented] at a certain time . . . . The directive of
the Sages was to rule in a manner that is the best answer to the needs at a
certain time.

Id. There were scholars who claimed that this outlook was identical to the
outlook of Rabbi Yitzhak Aramah. See SARAH HELER-VILENSKY, RABBI
YITZHAK ARAMAH AND HIS PHILOSOPHY 50-57 (1956); Aaron
Kirschenbaum, Maimonides and Equity, in MAIMONIDES AS CODIFIER OF
JEWISH LAW 143-44 (Nahum Rakover ed., 1987).
113
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b.
114
See Psalms 51:12 (“Create in me a pure heart, G-d and renew a steadfast spirit
within me.”).
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Maimonides.115 Aristotle wrote: “When the law speaks universally . .
. this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is
defective owing to its universality. In fact, this is the reason why all
things are not determined by law.”116 Maimonides emphasized the
importance of ensuring that the general norms in the legal system be
adapted to meet the requirements stemming from the special
circumstances of each case. He explained that a mechanism for
correction of the severity or leniency of the regular principles of law is
necessary.117 In appropriate circumstances that justify the exercise of
the special authority granted to the Jewish court or rabbi, they should
provide a fitting response, and act in a different manner. This activity
of the court and rabbis might include the enactment of new regulations,
adopting rules which are different from those that were binding in
Jewish law in the past, when the needs at a certain time justify this
enactment.118
Later, Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz, a Jewish scholar who was
active in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, emphasized that there
is a connection between the “ultimate truth” and the need to apply
compassion and mercy, beyond the strict “din Torah,” in the Jewish
legal system. Rabbi Falk Katz instructed Jewish courts and rabbis,
who aspire to the ultimate truth in their decisions to keep in mind, their
obligation to apply Jewish values and as a result to reach a conclusion

115

Concerning this influence, see MAIMONIDES, STUDIES IN METHODOLOGY,
METAPHYSICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93-123 (Chicago & London, 1990).
116
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 71-90, 145-62 (W.D. Ross trans., 1999).
117
See Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, 3:53. The chapter includes a definition
of mercy, law and charity. Law is the exact rule. Could be merciful or could be
revenge. But the desirable activity is in the path of mercy. The desirable activity is
to be good to others although the law does not demand this activity. The path of
mercy is the path of the Lord. Mercy and Charity are behaviors that are in the path
of equity and purify our soul. See JOSEPH ISAAC, MAIMONIDES ON ETHICS, ch. 8
(Gorfinkle ed. & trans., 1912) (concerning the cure of the diseases of the Soul,
Maimonides wrote that “the really praiseworthy is the medium course of action, to
which everyone should strive to adhere, always weighing his conduct carefully, so
that he may attain the proper mean . . . the saintly ones . . . deviated somewhat, by
way of [caution and] restraint.”).
118
See Itzhak Englard, The Problem of Equity in Maimonides, 21 ISR. L. REV. 296,
303 (1986); Itzhak Englard, The Problem of Equity in Maimonides, 14-15 SHENATON
HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 31, 37-40 (1989) (Hebrew); Shalom Rosenberg, For the Most
Part (‘Al Derekh ha-Rov’), 14-15 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 189, 194 (1989).
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that is beyond the strict law (din Torah (lit. biblical law)).119 When the
Jewish court and rabbi act in the proper, flexible, manner, they grant
significant weight to the values which are beyond the limited scope of
din Torah (strict, rigid law) and take into consideration all the possible
consequences of their rulings, now and in the future, in the day-to-day
life of those who will be affected, directly and indirectly, by their
decisions. In his opinion, Jewish judges and rabbis were given a range
of discretion and flexibility in exercising the principles of Jewish law
in order to achieve the desirable goal in their decision-making process:
their decisions should be not only the “truth” but also the just decision
in particular circumstances – ultimate truth.120 In his view, the
“ultimate truth” is not only the outcome of a process applied by Jewish
courts and rabbis, who have sufficient knowledge concerning the
relevant legal rules, and who try to reveal and expose, through careful
investigation, all the true relevant facts. Justice in law is the ultimate
truth. Determination of the “ultimate truth” requires the proper
operation of the jurisdiction of the Jewish court and rabbi. This
process takes place in the heart and soul of the Jewish judge and rabbi.
Their clean and pure souls should strive for a moral process of
introspection. Their thoughts should be about the moral way to
enhance the implementation of justice in the world. This is essential
in the process leading to the “ultimate truth.”
The viewpoint of Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz is based on the
assumption that the concept emet le-amito is tied to the concept of
“lifnim mi-shurat ha-din,” or the obligation to act in a merciful manner
that is beyond one’s formal and minimal obligation – “beyond the
letter of the [strict and harsh] law.” 121 He wrote that the Jewish judge
should act in his decision-making process in the following manner:
One must judge according to the [requirements of]
place and time (Judgment that is appropriate in a
particular place and time), so that his desirable actions
may be la’amito (they will be the ultimate truth). This
approach excludes the decision-making process that

119

Din Torah (lit. biblical law) was the strict law that was implemented during the
generation of the destruction of the Temple. See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia
30b.
120
See RABBI YAACOV BEN ASHER, SEFER HATURIM (TUR), HOSHEN MISHPAT ch. 1
(Jerusalem:1975) s.v. be’omram kol hadan din emet la’amito.
121
On the obligation to act “beyond the letter of the law” see supra note 100.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/6

28

Kaplan: Mercy in American Law

2021

MERCY IN AMERICAN LAW

1221

always follows the literal [strict] law of the Torah (the
implementation
of
the
exact
[strict
and
uncompromising] rules of din Torah). The Jewish
judge should not always follow the literal law of the
Torah (lit. biblical Jewish law). Sometimes he should
take into consideration the circumstances and
perspectives of human beings, at a particular time and
place, and may need to rule lifnim mi-shurat ha-din,
according to the requirements of the time and the place
(human circumstances of the case). 122. Should he fail
to do so (when he does not adopt this approach), even
though his ruling is the truth according to the narrow
and formal definition of the concept emet, it is not the
deeper and full meaning of the concept of truth: - emet
la’amito.123
The final conclusion, in light of the writings of these rabbis, is
that Jewish courts and rabbis who attempt to achieve the goal of
ultimate truth in the decision-making process should grant due weight
to the needs of the persons involved and other human beings who are
affected by these decisions. In the appropriate circumstances, they
should demonstrate empathy towards individuals who will be affected
by their decisions, and they must adopt a merciful and compassionate
approach in these decisions. Their activity must include an in-depth
consideration of the ramifications of their decisions, in an attempt to
discover all the possible impacts of any decision on the human life of
the affected human beings. If there is a possibility that deciding in a
strict manner is unnecessary, especially when they anticipate that it
will probably lead to undue suffering and difficulties for the persons
concerned, there is an obligation to act in a merciful manner that will
lead to the ultimate truth. The outcome of this approach of an
appropriate evaluation of all the relevant circumstances in light of the
122

In the next stage of presentation of the desirable policy Rabbi Yehoshua Falk Katz
presents the point of view of the ancient Jewish Sages in Babylonian Talmud,
Bava Metzia 30b,With respect to a court that adopts this wrong path:"[The Temple
in] Jerusalem was destroyed as a result of the activity of the judges [in the period of
the destruction of the Temple], who judged according to the law that was din Torah
(strict, rigid law) and did not add to their judgments an evaluation in light of the
second essential foundation: “beyond the letter of law” (ultimate truth).
123
Derisha on Sefer Haturim (Tur), Hoshen Mishpat 1, s.v. be’omram kol hadan din
emet la’amito.
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principles of Jewish law should be a deeper, more complete, humane,
fair process in Jewish law.
B.

Mercy – Essential Element in Judaism and the
Jewish Decision-Making Process

Jewish Sages in ancient times stressed that mercy is essential
as the dominant perspective in Judaism and complementary to the
strict rules of law. Some Sages stated that when the Lord created the
world and acted in the world, His final conclusion was that His main
teaching must be the teaching of the attribute of mercy.124 According
to these Sages, there was an essential shift in Judaism and Jewish law
from the perspective of strict law to that of mercy. This shift reflected
an attempt to adopt a pattern of activity that is in the image of the Lord.
The Sages explained that He knew, after He created the world, that if
He operates only according to the principles of strict law, the world
will not survive as a base for the successful activity of human beings
since they have their mistakes and sins. Therefore, the shift from strict
law to mercy is essential. According to the Sages, the Lord
understands that mercy is required as an essential component of His
evaluation and the human evaluation in the human judgment process.
The Creator uses this outlook to run the world:
The Lord said: “If I create the world only with the
attribute of mercy, there will be many sinners; if I create
it only with the attribute of strict law, the world will not
survive; rather, I will create it with [the attribute and
outlook of] strict law and the complementary essential

See Otiyot de-Rabbi Akiba 1 (“With the attribute of mercy, I created the world;
with the attribute of mercy, I direct it; with the attribute of mercy, I will renew it.”);
see also Sifrei Bambidbar, Pinhas 133 (“He who spoke and created the world has
mercy on all His creatures”); Tanna De-vei Eliyahu Zuta 6 (“By learning from the
ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, in the world, you can learn that he acts in great
mercy in the world.”); Midrash Shoher Tov, Ps. 119 (“David said: ‘Impose upon me
the mercies in which you created the world.’” Concerning this, we are told in the
verse: “You shall bring upon me to your mercy.” Psalms 119:77 (discussing the
activity of the lord in the world in the math of mercy); see also Babylonian Talmud,
Ketubot 50b; Midrash Tanhumah, Noah 6; Genesis, Rabba 33:3; Exodus Rabba 2:1;
Genesis, Zohar 21.
124
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component, mercy, and [I wish that in this pattern] may
the world last.”125
The significance of mercy in the world is evident in the Bible
after the creation of the world too, when the Lord shows Moses His
attributes as a response to the request, “[s]how me Your glory.”126 He
clarifies to Moses that as a human being, Moses can only see His
“back,” not His “face”; therefore, He shows him His attributes, the
foundations of Judaism.127 When “G-d” explains to Moses His
dominant outlook, He stresses that beyond truth, He acts in light of
many other important values, and He is “abundant in kindness.”128
Many divine attributes, as mentioned in this statement concerning the
attributes of the Creator of the World, involve compassion and mercy.
The Creator stated: “Lord, Lord, merciful and gracious G-d, slow to
anger, abundant in kindness and truth, keeping kindness for thousands,
forgiving sin, transgression and error.”129 “Truth” is sometimes harsh,
but all the other attributes are attributes of kindness and mercy. Mercy
is the dominant attribute.
The ancient Jewish text, the Babylonian Talmud, contains an
explanation of the statement in the Bible. The Sages explained that

125

Genesis, Rabba 12:19 (Theodor-Albeck ed.); cf. Pesikta Rabbati 45 (concerning
a similar outlook). A similar idea is expressed in the Babylonian Talmud, Avoda
Zara 3b. In this source, there is a statement about the essential move of God from
the throne of strict law to the throne of mercy. Similarly, see this shift in heaven
toward mercy in the context of the outcome of blowing the ram’s horn (shofar)
during prayer in the Jewish period of repentance. Leviticus Rabba 29:3.
126
Exodus 33, 18.
127
See Exodus 33, 17-23; 34, 1-7.
128
See Exodus 34, 6.
129
Exodus 34, 6-7. At the end of this statement, according to one possible
interpretation of this verse in the Bible, there is a one more attribute: “Who clears” this is the thirteenth attribute of mercy, according to the interpretation in Babylonian
Talmud, Shevuot 39a. Rabbi Elazar’s explanation there is that the Lord “clears”
after repentance. In addition, in the Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b, the
thirteen attributes of mercy are mentioned. However, the simple meaning of “who
clears,” as the commentator, Rashi notes ad loc., is that this term is attached to the
next clause concerning the significance of mercy in ancient Jewish texts. See also
Rabbi Menachem ben Shelomo Hameiri, Beit Ha-Bechira, Rosh Hashana 17b. See
also Nehemiah 9, 31 (“Nevertheless in Your manifold mercies You did not make a
full end of them, nor forsake them; for You are a gracious and merciful G-d.”). In
addition, G-d is called “The Merciful One” in the Jewish Grace After Meals. See
Deuteronomy 8, 10 (concerning the scriptural requirement to recite a blessing after a
meal).
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mercy should be the final and dominant stage. In the Babylonian
Talmud, Rabbi Elazar explained that the conclusion is that mercy is
the dominant attribute.130 In similar vein, the Sage Iffi contrasted two
statements in the biblical verse: 131 “It is written, ‘abundant in
kindness,’ and then it is written, ‘and truth.’ [How is this]? - At first,
‘truth,’ and at the end ‘abundant in kindness.’”132 At the beginning of
the biblical verse describing the attributes of the Creator of the World,
His name is mentioned twice in a row: “Lord, Lord.” This designation
of the Creator, according to the Sages, refers to His merciful nature.133
The thirteen traits in this verse are known collectively as the
Thirteen Attributes of Mercy.134 In the Jewish prayer, especially on
fast days – including Yom Hakipurim, the major day of atonement –
when every Jew seeks to benefit from the mercy of the Lord, these
thirteen attributes are recited several times. An ancient Jewish Sage,
Rabbi Judah, stated: “A covenant has been made [between the Lord
and human beings], pertaining to the thirteen attributes, that [when
they are recited] they will not be turned away [by the Lord, who will
leave the requesting individuals] empty-handed.”135 Under this
covenant, recitation of these attributes of mercy arouse the mercy of
the Lord in Heaven, and the requests of human beings are not
rejected.136
The Sages also explained that the noble “power” of the Lord is
not physical strength nor His power in nature. His noble “power” is
expressed when He holds back from using his power and acts with
pardon and mercy towards His creatures. His noble choice not to
overuse His power is heroic.137 The ideal course of action is

130

See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b.
See Exodus 34, 6-7.
132
Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b.
133
A number of sources indicate that the meaning of the term “Lord,” when the Bible
mentions the Creator of the World, is the Creator that adopts the path of mercy. See
Mekhilta, Beshalah 13; Sifrei, Va’et’hanan 27; Genesis, Rabba 33:3; Babylonian
Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b; see also Rashi ad loc., s.v. “Lord, Lord” (explaining
that the repetition of the name of the Creator - “Lord, Lord” - refers to His mercies
before and after sin, respectively).
134
See Midrash Numbers Rabba 21:17.
135
Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b.
136
See Rashi on Rosh Hashanah 17b, s.v. berit keurtah lishlosh esreh midot.
137
In Babylonian Talmud, Megilla 31a, Rabbi Yohanan equates the Lord’s greatness
with His humility. In light of the verses in which it is written that the Creator of the
World cares for the weak in society, for the orphan and for the widow, for the victim
131
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established in Scripture: “[t]he Lord is slow to anger, abundant in
kindness, forgiving sin and transgression”; 138 “G-d Lord, You have
begun to show Your servant Your greatness and Your strong hand.”139
The Sages explained how the greatness of the Lord is evident when He
is “slow to anger, abundant in kindness, forgiving sin and
transgression.”140 The strong right hand of the Lord is stretched out in
kindness, mercy, forgiveness, and pardon for all the creatures in the
world. His “[right strong] hand” is strong because He prefers the path
of mercy over the path of strict law. He suppresses the overuse of
strength, ensures there is no unnecessary stubbornness, or arbitrary
decision-making or cruelty, in His activity141 The Sages presented
their outlook that the Lord prefers the path of forgiveness and
compassion.142
The Sages also stressed that a human being should adopt this
way of the Lord. He should adopt the path of mercy, and the readiness
to forbear and not be trapped in negative emotions. This is true human
power. Overcoming anger, vengeance, and other negative emotions in

of the oppressor and for the individual who is low in spirit, he states that the
“greatness” of the Lord is His activity in a “humble” manner. Id.
138
Numbers 14, 18.
139
Deuteronomy 3, 24.
140
See Exodus 34, 6-7.
141
See SIFREI BAMIDBAR, 180-81 (H.S. Horovitz ed., Jerusalem 1966) (“‘Your
greatness’ - this is Your goodness, as is stated: ‘And now the strength of the Lord
will grow.’ ‘And your hand’ this is Your right hand, stretched out [in kindness and
mercy] to all the people in the world . . . ‘The strong [hand]’ - You conquer with
mercy the strictness in law. This is stated in the verse: ‘Who is like you [the Lord] who bears a sin and transgresses a crime.’”). See Micah 6,18-20; see also
Deuteronomy 3, 24).
142
Some claimed that enforcement in the ancient Jewish criminal law system was
weak, leading to the policy of the ancient Jewish courts not to convict criminals
although they were morally culpable, only stating only that they are morally
culpable. According to this perspective, the legal acquittal of those who are suspects
in Jewish criminal law is a result of the weakness of the enforcement system in
Jewish law. See P. Dickstein, Development of the Jewish Criminal Law System Until
the Redaction of the Talmud, 1 HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 198 (1926). However, I believe
that many acquittals may have resulted from the Sages’ views concerning the
significant weight of mercy in the Jewish legal system, especially in capital
punishment cases. The Sages believed that Jews have to follow the directives of the
Lord and choose His path. The “greatness” of a Jewish court is not the adoption of
a harsh policy, with many convictions. The path of mercy leads to many acquittals
or milder punishments of individuals who should be given the benefit of doubt or
who perpetrated their crimes in mitigating circumstances.
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the relationship between Jews, in the Jewish legal system and in other
spheres of activity of Jews, is the appropriate expression of power.
The Jewish hero “conquers his temptation.”143 Implementation of this
policy contributes to strengthening social values such as mutual
support and hope for a better future for all members of society.
The way of mercy of the Creator when requests in prayer are
presented to Him is evident in a passage in the Babylonian Talmud
explaining the format of G-d’s decision-making process when
deciding if He will be merciful concerning requests of Jews in their
prayers. The Talmud states that an individual should not recite the
Mussaf prayer in the first three hours of the day. During these hours,
the Holy One focuses upon the exact, uncompromising principles of
Judaism and His pattern of activity, concerning requests of the
creatures in the world, is the adoption of the strict standard. The
Jewish individual should recite the Mussaf prayer during the next three
hours of the day
because [at that stage] the Lord, who implemented at
the first stage the strict standard of ‘law,’ reaches the
conclusion that the world will be destroyed if the
standard of His evaluation will be strict. He therefore
abandons this approach (lit. abandons his seat of ‘law’)
of severe and strict judgment, and adopts the
perspective of mercy.144
At this stage, His acceptance of the petition of the person who
prays to him is not limited to a narrow and strict perspective, based
upon what should be accepted and not accepted according to the strict
standard.145 During the hours that are suitable for the Mussaf prayer,
“The Holy One, blessed is He, grants due weight to the standard [of
mercy] which is beyond the strict letter of law.” 146 He does not judge
human beings only according to the strict letter of law. The prayer
during this appropriate time – of compassion and fulfillment of

143

Mishnah, Avot 4:1.
See Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah 3b.
145
Rashi on Avodah Zarah 3b, s.v. din lo ketiv bey emet. The outcome of this
commentary should be that judges in a Jewish court, who should act in light of the
guidance of the Lord, should also prefer the approach of mercy in the decisions of a
Jewish court.
146
Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 4b.
144
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requests – could enhance the probability of achievement of the goal
The Lord will be kind and accept the requests in prayer.
i.

Mercy in Jewish Courts and Rulings of Rabbis
1.

The Ancient Sages

In the ancient biblical texts, there are no explicit directives to
judges to act in accordance with to their obligation to follow the path
of mercy of the Lord. However, all Jews, including Jewish judges, are
bound to act, in a manner that is in the image of the Lord. 147 The
attributes of mercy are an ideal, and should guide all Jews in their
activity, since every Jew must walk in the path which was paved for
him by the Lord and imitate the pattern of conduct of the Creator. In
court, too, they must act in light of Jewish morals and ethics and fulfill
the obligation of all Jews to imitate the ways of the Lord and adopt His
path of mercy.148
In the Tannaitic and Amoraic period that followed, the Sages
stressed in their exegesis that adoption of this pattern, the act of
imitatio Dei, is essential for all Jews.149 In the medieval period, Jewish
law and Jewish philosophy sources provided an explanation

147

See Deuteronomy 26, 16-17; 28, 9.
Biblical law requires that every Jew will walk in the ways of the Lord. See id.
149
The Sage Abba Shaul, interpreting Exodus 15, 2, stated that a Jew should act in
the image of the Creator: “I shall act like him. He is merciful and gracious, You too
should be merciful and gracious.” 3 MEKHILETA DE-RABBI YISHMAEL, BESHALAH,
PARASHAH 127 (Horowitz-Rabin ed., 1931); Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133b; see
also Yalkut Shim’oni, Exodus 15, 245; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah De’ot 1:6. This
approach of the Sages is evident in another source, Sifrei, Ekev 49t: “The attribute
of the Lord is merciful, you also should be merciful. The Holy One, blessed be He,
pardons and is gracious, you also should pardon and be gracious.” Cf. Midrassh
Tanchuma, Vayishlach 10:4, s.v. yelamdenu rabbenu; Tanna De-bei Eliyahu Rabba
24, s.v. bi-zman she-adam mekhabbed; Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 14a. A similar
outlook is evident in the ancient sources that state that the Lord implanted mercy in
the hearts of human beings. See Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 5:3; Tanna De-bei
Eliyahu Rabba, 29; see also the Rabbi David Kimchi (Radak) & Metzudat David,
Commentary, I Kings 2:3. However, in some ancient sources, the perspective is
different. According to these sources, at the first stage there is no mercy of the Lord.
His shift to mercy emerges in His response to requests in prayers of pious individuals.
See Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 14a; see also Tanna De-bei Eliyahu Zuta, 7;
Jerusalem Talmud, Ta’anit 4:5 (concerning the requirement that individuals perform
the desirable acts that lead to the mercy of the Lord).
148

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 6

1228

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

concerning the essence of this pattern of desirable activity for all Jews.
One of these medieval sources was the Sefer Hahinukh,150 probably
authored by a Jewish scholar in Spain in the thirteenth or fourteenth
century.151 In this work, the essence of all commandments in the Bible
is explained. One of these commandments is the obligation to walk in
the path which was paved for each Jew by the Lord. The author
explains:
It is a commandment to imitate the good and righteous
ways of the Lord . . . . He commanded us to do all our
deeds in our relationship with other individuals in the
path of kindness and mercy, with all our power. We
should divert all our activity, in our relationships with
other people, to the path of mercy and compassion,
since we know that in the Bible this is the path of the
Lord, and He desires that human beings will adopt the
path of mercy. If they act in this manner they will
benefit from the goodness of the Creator, since He
desires that they be kind and gracious, and this
commandment is stated in the words in the verse: “And
you shall walk in His ways.”152 The Lord is Merciful,
you also should be merciful.153
This guidance is also applicable in a Jewish court. Mercy and
rulings which are beyond the strict letter of law are essential in the
sphere of the activity of judges as well and should also be evident when
they evaluate facts and legal arguments of individuals according to the
principles of Jewish law. The result of the deliberations of Jewish
judges and rabbis, who adopt the ways of the Lord, should be a
desirable relationship among law, truth, compassion and mercy. 154 It
150

A book that explains the essence of all the commandments of the Creator in the
Bible.
151
There are different views about the identity of the author of this book.
152
See Deuteronomy 28, 9; see also Deuteronomy 5, 30; 8, 6; 10, 12; 11, 22; 13, 5;
19, 9; 26:17; 30,16 (concerning the commandment 611).
153
Sefer Hahinukh, Commandment 611.
154
See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17b. In this text, the Sages explained
that G-d’s activity as a judge is as follows: first He acts according to the strict letter
of the law, and subsequently, following further evaluation, He acts in light of the
assumption that mitigation of the strict law is necessary because the world cannot
survive when the strict laws are implemented. See Babylonian Talmud, Rosh
Hashanah 17b; see also Tosafot ad loc. s.v. ba-tehila.
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should lead to the adoption of a merciful and compassionate outlook,
in the appropriate circumstances. Implementation of this policy should
lead to the achievement of the goal: an appropriate and just outcome. 155
Mercy in the judgments and punishments of Jewish courts, and in the
halakhic rulings of rabbis, is essential in the appropriate
circumstances.
The ancient Sages stressed that the commandment to act in a
merciful manner is even more important for powerful individuals, who
can inflict more damage by misusing their power. These individuals
in particular, including judges, must have mercy on their fellow men
when determining their fates, and act beyond the letter of the strict law,
in the appropriate circumstances.156 There is a moral demand that
these individuals act, in appropriate circumstances, beyond the strict
letter of law.157
The principle that judges should act in a merciful manner, when
possible, is evident in the literature of the Sages in various contexts.
In certain areas of judicial activity, the Sages grant great significance
to mercy. One context is the eligibility for nomination as a judge in
the Sanhedrin, the ancient supreme Jewish legislating instance and
supreme Jewish court. The Sages stated that an elderly, castrated or
childless individual is ineligible for nomination as member of the
Sanhedrin.158 The common medieval reason given for this rule is that
these individuals do not feel the grief of child-rearing, and therefore,
they may act in an unjustifiably cruel manner in their activity in the
Sanhedrin.159 This rule might apply only to the criminal sphere, when
judges must decide a person’s fate, and the decision might impinge on
one’s life, good name, and honor. The consequences of the judgment
155

See Zohar, Leviticus, 65 (explaining the clear view that wherever justice exists,
mercy exists).
156
The commandment is directed to the king as well. He should ensure the world is
corrected and not do any evil; he should be a leader of the people of his subjects
adopting the path of mercy. See RABBI DAVID ADANI, MIDRASH HA-GADOL,
EXODUS 21:1, 452 (Jerusalem 1976).
157
See Y. Rosenberg, Kol Ha-omer…Eino Ela To’eh, 4 NETUIM 79, 79-88 (1998).
158
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 36b. In the medieval period, there were those
who interpreted this rule as follows: even if the judge was fit to be a judge at the time
of appointment but has become elderly or castrated, he is disqualified at present and
must be removed. See Responsa of Rashba 6:191. See also Responsa of Hatam
Sofer, Yoreh De’ah 7.
159
See Rashi, Commentary, Sanhedrin 36b, s.v zaken; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah,
Sanhedrin 2:3.
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in criminal law, especially the punishment, may be particularly severe.
Maimonides states that this rule applies to “capital punishment law.” 160
However, capital punishment in Jewish law was abolished before his
day, at the time of the ancient Sages, 161 Maimonides did not state that
this rule is irrelevant in the medieval period. It is possible that in the
writings of Maimonides, the category “capital punishment law”
belongs in the sphere of Jewish criminal law. It includes crimes that
do not lead to the death penalty. According to Menachem Elon, who
does not interpret “capital punishment” literally but according to the
context of its implementation in Jewish sources – “capital punishment
law” in Jewish law refers to all spheres of Jewish criminal law.162
According to the medieval interpretation of the rule in the
Talmud, the elderly, castrated or childless are not totally disqualified
in the Jewish courts. Medieval Jewish law scholars stated that these
individuals can testify in legal proceedings and can also adjudicate in
monetary matters, as mercy is not needed in the same manner in this
area.163 The main rationale for these rules is that in testifying, an
individual does not fulfill the role of a judge who determines the fate
of the suspect in criminal cases. In addition, in monetary matters,
mercy shown to one litigant could lead to a harsh and unjustified
outcome from the point of view of the other litigant. In civil conflicts
– in which the fate of a person is not usually determined with the same
severe ramifications as are common in criminal law, especially in
serious cases – the legal system does not impose strict eligibility
requirements to ensure that the Jewish judge will be merciful and
compassionate, when the implementation of such a policy is possible.
2.

No Pity is to be Shown?

Indeed, Rabbi Akiba, the Tannaitic Sage, states: “No pity is
to be shown when there are rules in the law pertaining to a legal

160

See Mishneh Torah, Testimony 16:6.
See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
162
See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (HAMISHPAT HA-IVRI) 149-50 (2d ed., 1978).
163
See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Testimony 16:6 (stating that they may testify
but not judge capital cases); see also Rabbi Joseph Karo, Commentary, Kessef
Mishneh (explaining that a similar rationale is applicable to the childless, as they too
are not merciful. However, the elderly, childless and the castrated may judge
monetary cases).
161
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matter.”164 However, this does not negate the use of mercy in criminal
law, since the context of this statement is important. 165 This was the
rule pertaining to a monetary dispute. The dispute mentioned in the
Mishnah concerned a man who died and left a wife, who claimed she
was entitled to her monetary rights stemming from the marriage,
granted to her in the ketubah. However, a creditor claiming the
repayment of his debt, and heirs expecting their inheritance, had their
own monetary claims. The deceased husband had a deposit or a loan
in the possession of others. In this case, Rabbi Tarfon ruled that the
money would be given to the individual in this dispute who is under
the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiba had a contrary point of view:
“No pity is to be shown when there are rules in the law pertaining to a
legal matter.”166 In criminal law, however, Rabbi Akiba supported the
implementation of mercy as an important consideration. He rejected
bias in the legal process in favor of the weak litigants in monetary civil
conflicts, in which the bias in favor of one side is necessarily an
unjustified bias, from the perspective of the other parties, against the
other side. This position was based on the Biblical prohibitions of
showing favoritism to a pauper.167 In criminal law, his general position
was expressed in his rejection of capital punishment. This punishment
would require the use of the cruelest punishment: death. Mercy in
criminal law requires the shift from biblical law to the law of the Sages:
de facto the death penalty is abolished. Rabbi Akiba and Rabbi Tarfon
were in agreement about capital punishment. They stated that if they
were members of the superior legislative body and Supreme Court ―
the Sanhedrin ― “No one would be killed” as a result of the legal
process in this Court. 168 Maybe this would be the special policy
164

Mishnah Ketubot 9:2.
Indeed, Rabbi Samson Rafael Hirsch favored a general policy of a strict approach
in relation to punishments of court. In his commentary, he wrote that in a legal
system, there is no need to give the benefit of the doubt to the accused. See Rabbi
Samson Rafael Hirsch, Commentary, Leviticus 19, 15 (2012). However, this outlook
seems to contradict the policy in many other Jewish sources, according to which the
court must argue and raise claims that may lead to the acquittal of the accused,
particularly in capital punishment cases.
166
Mishnah Ketubot 9:2.
167
See Exodus 23, 3; see also Leviticus 19, 15.
168
See Mishnah, Makot 1:10. The Mishnah also presents the strict point of view of
Raban Gamliel, that as a result of the implementation of the policy of Rabbi Akiba
and Rabbi Tarfon there will be less deterrence and more murders in the population.
Id.
165
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pertaining to capital punishment, which is irreversible, since after this
punishment, there is no option of correcting mistakes. However, this
is probably the outcome of a general policy. Rabbi Akiba held that the
biblical prohibition on showing favoritism to the poor forbids twisting
the law in a civil case to benefit the disadvantaged and weak.169
The statement of Rabbi Akiba and Rabbi Tarfon coincides with
the shift from biblical law to the law of the Sages that abolished, de
facto, the death penalty in the period of the Sages. The general trend
in Jewish law in the period of the Sages is a shift from the strict outlook
of biblical law to an approach that focuses upon mercy in relation to
the most severe ultimate penalty – capital punishment. Rabbi Akiba
also interprets the rule pertaining to mercy in a verse in the Bible 170 as
forbidding the execution of minors along with the rest of the residents
of an apostate city.171 The same verse is used in the literature of the
Sages as support for mercy being a defining characteristic of Jews. 172
3.

The Medieval Period

The desire to avoid unnecessary harsh activity of judges in
the sphere of Jewish criminal law is evident also in sources in the
medieval period. Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Aderet stressed that
especially when the decision of the court concerning the punishment
of a criminal might be powerful and too severe, it is important that the
Jewish judges exercise more “supervision” and caution and ensure that
their mode of activity is mild and moderate. 173 They should take into
consideration the human factor and the significance of mercy and try
to avoid decisions that are the outcome of anger. 174 The guiding

169

His opposition is not to mercy in the legal process but rather to unfairly favoring
a weak litigant in this process. In the Mishnah, the question is whether preference
should be given to the widow, who is considered to be disadvantaged over other
litigants, such as the heirs. J.D. EISENSTEIN, OTZAR DINIM U-MINHAGIM 82 (1917)
(arguing that the rule of Rabbi Akiba applies to a certain type of civil claim: mercy
towards a damager in the context of fines).
170
Deuteronomy 13, 18.
171
See Tosefta Sanhedrin 14:3 (Zuckermandel ed.).
172
See Babylonian Talmud, Yebamot 79a; Deuteronomy Rabba, Ekev 3, 4.
173
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
174
See Responsa of Rashba 5:238; see also Rabbi Menachem ben Shlomo Hameiri
in BEIT HA-BEHIRAH, Gittin 241 (Jerusalem 5724-1964) (stating in another context,
“Never shall a person act in a manner that is contrary to the desirable attributes [of
the Lord], and he should not be strict and cruel to his enemies and should not act in

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/6

40

Kaplan: Mercy in American Law

2021

MERCY IN AMERICAN LAW

1233

principle in decision making concerning punishments in Jewish law is
expressed in the following statement: “Most Jewish scholars (courts
and rabbis) acted with extreme caution when they exercised their
power of punishment and were very careful not to impose an
[unjustified] extreme punishment.”175
It is clear that even in the dispute between litigants in the
realm of monetary matters, some medieval rabbis praised the practice
in Jewish decision making of judgments in favor of the weaker party.
When there is no significant harm to the other party as a result of bias
by the judge in favor of the weak and the weaker litigant, the
“pauper,”176 which harms another litigant unlawfully, even in
monetary matters the judge or rabbi should rule “beyond the letter of
the strict law,” in light of the attribute of mercy. Rabbi Chaim Ben
Yechiel, a medieval Ashkenazi Sage, dealt with a monetary dispute
between a widow and her orphaned son. He wrote that in his opinion,
the legal claims of the orphan were more convincing and the case
should not be judged in favor of the weaker litigant, the widow, since
in monetary matters the rule is, “No pity is to be shown when there are
rules in the law pertaining to a legal matter.” 177 Nevertheless, at the
end of his ruling on this matter, he attributed certain weight to the
attribute of mercy even though the matter was a monetary one. He
wrote that he was willing to allow an additional act to be performed in
favor of the widow “beyond the strict letter of the law.” She had eight
days in which she could consult with other individuals who were
familiar with the principles of Jewish law regarding his ruling and his
reasoning. If their claims on appeal would be convincing, he would
retract this ruling, and rule in favor of the widow.178
Another medieval scholar of Franco-German Jewry, Rabbi
Jacob Molin, discussed the request of a widow to allow her to live in a
place where a “ban on settlement in the place [of nonresidents]”
applied. It was argued, inter alia, that she was “forced” to remain there
since she was ill. Initially, Rabbi Molin rejected the claim that he
should rule in favor of the widow since she was the poor, weaker,
a manner that is contrary to morality as a result of his hatred or his desire to
revenge.”).
175
Eliyahu Ben-Zimra, Considerations of Punishment in Jewish Criminal Law as
Reflected in Responsa Literature, 8 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 36 (1981).
176
See Exodus 23, 3; Leviticus 19, 15.
177
Mishnah, Ketubot 9:2.
178
See Responsa of Maharam 249.
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litigant and “needed assistance.” 179 He explained that as long as she
did not have a right to settle in that place according to the law, due to
the ban on settlement in the place, enacted by the Jewish community,
the residents of that place were not obligated to act more charitably
than other Jews.180 According to the principles of strict law, all Jews
share the burden of charity equally. Only if there is a custom in this
community to permit the settlement of weaker non-residents would the
widow have a solid legal claim. Nevertheless, he wrote that although
the rule of the Sages is that “No pity is to be shown when there are
rules in the law pertaining to a legal matter,” and therefore it is not
appropriate to rule in favor of the widow because we feel sorry for her,
there is a new medieval rule in Jewish Franco-German sources.
According to the new rule, when possible, in light of the circumstances
of the case, a Jew is bound by Jewish law to fulfill his obligation to act
beyond the letter of the strict law.181 According to this medieval
outlook, the rule “No pity is to be shown when there are rules in the
law pertaining to a legal matter” does not prohibit the implementation
of mercy and compassion in appropriate circumstances.182 However,
in this case the rule pertaining to the “ban on of settlement in the place”
was important and enhanced the welfare of the members of the local
community. It prevented commercial competition that could endanger
the economic stability of the members of the local community.
Therefore, Rabbi Molin’s conclusion was that only in special
extraordinary circumstances, such as the settlement in the community
of a rabbi who teaches the principles of Jewish law, was this general
rule not applicable. Mercy on behalf of a widow does not justify
deviation from this important rule.
4.

Mercy and Ruling Beyond the Strict
Letter of the Law in Jewish Law and
Courts in the Twentieth Century

The obligation to act in a merciful manner in a Jewish court
and in the halakhic decisions of rabbis is evident in modern times in
179

See Responsa of Maharil ha-Hadashot 147.
Id.
181
In this responsum, he mentioned the point of view of Rabbi Eliezer Ben Yoel
Halevi, quoted at the end of Mordechai, Bava Batra 482, that it is “appropriate to
have mercy on the poor, when the circumstances justify this activity.”
182
See Responsa of Maharil ha-Hadashot 147.
180
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the writings of influential Chief Rabbis of the Land of Israel in the
twentieth century. In his commentary to the Jewish prayer book, Rabbi
Abraham Yitzchak Hacohen Kook, the first Chief Rabbi of the Land
of Israel, explained the deeper meaning of statements in verses in
Psalms that are part of the Sabbath morning prayer:
The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul; the
testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.
The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart;
the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the
eyes. The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever;
the ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous
altogether. More to be desired are they then gold, yea,
than much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the
honeycomb. Who can discern his errors? Clear Thou
me from hidden faults.183
According to Rabbi Kook, the ultimate goal of Jewish law is stated in
these verses. The verse states: “The ordinances of the Lord are true,
they are righteous altogether.” 184 Rabbi Kook explained that human
private law is not perfect and pure: it is “very complicated and vague
. . . serves material interests . . . and has many defects . . . many defects
lead to the conclusion of absence of truth.” 185 On the other hand,
Jewish law, the law of the Lord, is an attempt to remedy all these
defects, and as a result His law is “true… righteous altogether,” a law
of truth and justice. 186 The implementation of this law leads to good
feelings of “light,” “happiness,” and “total perfection” in the eternal
soul of human beings.187 He stressed that the goal of the laws of the
Lord is not only to “solve temporary disputes in life of human beings,”
but to “elevate life and universe from the low place of the sinner to the
‘High Holy’ Place of the ‘Holy of Holies.’” 188 The overall
appropriateness of the details of the Jewish legal system to all that life

183

Psalms 19:7, 10-13.
See Psalms 19:10.
185
See RABBI ABRAHAM YITZCHAK HACOHEN KOOK, OLAT REIYA II 57-58
(Jerusalem 1949) (“The ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous
altogether.”).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 56 (“The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul.”).
188
Id. at 59 (“Moreover, by them is Thy servant warned; in keeping of them there is
great reward.”).
184
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and the universe need, is the element of sweetness of the laws of the
Lord.189
His other writings also emphasize the significance of mercy in
Jewish law in a more direct manner. Rabbi Kook, who was also active
in the sphere of decision-making in Jewish law, cited the text from the
Talmud declaring that the temple in Jerusalem was destroyed because
the judges, members of the court in the Destruction generation, based
their verdicts solely “on the basis of [strict] Torah law and did not go
beyond the letter of the law.” 190 He explained that the policy of
implementing strict law should not prevent the implementation of
mercy in law, including the practice of showing favoritism to a
pauper.191 In justified circumstances, the principle pertaining to the
pauper does not preclude mercy and acting beyond the letter of the law
in Jewish judicial process:
The attribute of mercy is an important guideline,
especially in legislation in Jewish law . . . also in the
decisions of Jewish judges in private matters . . . . The
obligation to act beyond the letter of the law, in
appropriate circumstances, is part of the rule of law.
The Sages stated that the Temple in Jerusalem was
destroyed because the judges in the generation of the
Destruction only implemented the strict principles of
law and did not judge beyond the strict letter of the law
[when that was required]. 192 This basic approach is also
relevant when we interpret the commandment in the
[Biblical] verse: “Do not favor a pauper in his
dispute.”193 This verse determines that according
weight to mercy is not permitted [in behalf of the
pauper] only when the judge does not pay attention at
all to the strict rules of the law, but issues his decision
only as a result of his mercy for the pauper. However,
See id. at 58 (“More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold;
sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb.”).
190
See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b (utilizing this author’s translation and
explanation); cf. Yalkut Shimoni, Iggeret Ha-Rav Kook, in SEFER ZIKARON LEAVRAHAM SPIEGELMAN 1085 (1991) (“Jerusalem was destroyed solely due to
corruption of justice.”).
191
See Exodus 23, 3; Leviticus 19, 15.
192
See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b.
193
Exodus 23, 3; see also Leviticus 19, 15.
189
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when proper weight is also given in the decisionmaking process to the regular principles of law and the
fundamental principles of Jewish law, the judge should
also act, when appropriate, in light of his legal right to
incorporate in the legal process the attributes of mercy
and compassion, in order to assist the unfortunate, lost,
and oppressed human beings.194
Later in the twentieth century, two influential Chief Rabbis of
the Land of Israel, Rabbi Yitzchak Herzog and Rabbi Benzion Chai
Ouziel, stressed yet again that adopting the path of mercy, paved by
the Lord, is an essential activity of a Jewish judge.
According to Rabbi Herzog, the judge should attribute
importance to basic Jewish values in the judicial process.195 This
includes granting preference to mercy over the severity of strict law in
a manner leading to “just law” and doing “what is good” in the judicial
process whenever possible. 196
Rabbi Herzog cited the talmudic interpretation of the verse in
Micah: “It hath been told thee, O man, what is good, and what the Lord
doth require of thee: only to do just law, and to love mercy, and to walk
humbly with your Lord.”197 The Sages explained that in this verse, the
prophet Micah condensed the commandments of the Five Books of
Moses into three basic principles: “To do justice, to love kindness and
to walk humbly with your Lord.”198 Rabbi Herzog explained that these
are also the three guidelines for judges in a Jewish court who
implement principles of Jewish law.199 The highest level of mercy is
the love of kindness and mercy. 200 There should be a “constant desire
to act in a merciful manner.”201 He stressed that:
strict law is not the height of the Jewish ideal [in the
judicial process]; rather, this ideal is going beyond the
letter of the law: The prophet Micah condensed the

194

RABBI ABRAHAM YITZCHAK HACOHEN KOOK, IGGERET HA-RAV KOOK, SEFER
ZIKARON LE-AVRAHAM SPIEGELMAN 67 (A. Morgenstern ed., 5739-1979).
195
See Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 278-29 (5746-1986).
196
See id.
197
Micah 6, 8.
198
See Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 24a.
199
See Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 278-279 (5746-1986).
200
See id.
201
See id.
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basic principles of Judaism to three basic principles:
“To do justice, to love kindness.” There are three
degrees [of activity of judges], each one superior to the
other: “To do justice” – is [acting in the sphere of
regular strict] law; above this degree is “to love
kindness” – acting in a merciful manner, beyond the
letter of the strict law. And there is also a higher aspect
to this degree. In Judaism, mercy in a person’s actions
is not sufficient. Judaism not only mandates the
implementation of the attribute of kindness in practice:
the higher level is kindness, mercy and compassion in
the heart – “to love kindness.” This “love” is the
constant desire to act in a merciful manner – the inner
desire to perform kind deeds. The third, higher and
ultimate level is “to walk humbly with your Lord” – to
always be filled with the internal knowledge that the
whole world is filled with His glory. Certainly, strict
law is not the height of the Jewish ideal [in the judicial
process]; rather, the ideal is to go beyond the letter of
the biblical law.202
He further explained that only in extraordinarily specific cases,
the special aggravating circumstances lead to the conclusion that “[w]e
do not show mercy in law”203 or that judges should “let the law cut
through the mountain.”204 But, this is not the general rule guiding the
activity of Jewish judges. The basic principle in Jewish courts is stated
in Deuteronomy: “And thou shalt do that which is right and good in
the sight of the Lord.”205 According to this principle, a Jewish judge
must act in light of the assumption that the general overarching
principles of Jewish law “are rooted in abundant mercy and
morality.”206 According to Rabbi Herzog’s outlook in this text, in
order to prevent “distortion of the law,” a clear and direct integration
of the principles of Jewish law with mercy is essential, when it is

202

Yitzchak Herzog, Battei Din Be-Yisrael, 7 TECHUMIN 277, 278-79 (5746-1986)
(emphasis added).
203
See Mishnah Ketubot 9:2; see also Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 84a.
204
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 6b.
205
Deuteronomy 6, 18.
206
Yitzchak Herzog, supra note 202 at 278-79.
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possible.207 Compassion and mercy are necessary in all aspects of the
Jewish legal proceedings, including the judgment of litigants and
criminals and the process leading to the halakhic rulings of rabbis.208
The essential nature of mercy in the Jewish legal process, as
well as in the activity of judges in the Rabbinical Courts, is also evident
in the writings of Rabbi Benzion Chai Ouziel, the Sephardic Chief
Rabbi of the Land of Israel at the time of Rabbi Herzog, after the period
of Rabbi Kook:
In his directive to the public, Rabbi Ouziel stressed that
adoption of the path of mercy is the desirable manner
of conduct of Jewish individuals. They should
implement mercy in their relationships with other
people, and as a result, the Lord will reward them and
will be merciful to them, when that is necessary.209 He
also stressed that all Jews should accord due weight to
the directive to always act in a merciful manner when
possible, and fulfill their obligation to act in a manner
that adopts the ways of the Lord. The Lord is merciful
and therefore every Jew too should be merciful. Mercy
is essential in Judaism and Jewish law.210
He also discussed the proper mode of action of every Jewish
judge, who acts in the image of the Creator, who is his role model. His
directive to the Jewish judge was that he should act in light of the
guidance of the Sages and be merciful in legal proceedings. 211 He
stressed:

207

See id.
See id.
209
Rabbi Ouziel and Rabbi Amiel wrote to Jews who lent money and pleaded on
behalf of those who in difficult financial times could not return the money on time:
“Behave with mercy in your relationship to other human beings. This mercy will
result in the same attitude of the Lord toward us, and there will be a merciful response
to our requests.” Rabbi Benzion Meir Chai Ouziel & Rabbi Mosheh Avigdor Amiel,
An Appeal to Debtor and Creditors to be Merciful to Those who Have Debts,
MIKHMANEY OUZIEL 466-67 (5769-2009).
210
See 2 BENZION MEIR CHAI OUZIEL, HEGYONEI OUZIEL 106 (5752-1992)
[hereinafter: HEGYONEI OUZIEL]. See also id. at 49-50. “The Bible states: ‘His
mercies are on all He created.’” Psalms 145:149; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Metzia 85a.
211
See HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 106.
208
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Our Sages, of blessed memory, stated: “Whoever
judges [in a manner that is an attempt to achieve the
goal of din emet la-amito becomes a partner of the Holy
One Blessed be He in the creation of the world.” 212
Jewish law is not like the law of other nations . . . The
Jewish judges (Dayanim) are the messengers of the
Lord of justice . . . They derive their basic outlook from
a higher place. This sublime recognition implants the
holy dread of G-d in the heart and soul of Jewish
judges, witnesses and litigants. That leads them to
proper conduct, of imitating the ways of the Lord of
judgment in all their actions, and the attempt to achieve
the goal of Din Emet La-amito.213
Similarly, according to Rabbi Ouziel, rulings of a Jewish judge
or rabbi should attempt to act with mercy and rule beyond the strict
letter of the law. Jewish judges or rabbis should find out, in each case,
if the implementation of the merciful outlook is possible. There is no
clear-cut rule in the Jewish books dictating how to act in a merciful
manner in each case, but the general trend should be that these officials
should always implement their wisdom and prefer the merciful
decision.214 When a Jewish judge or rabbi adopts the ways of the Lord
and attributes due weight to his obligation to act in a merciful manner,
he should attempt to achieve
absolute justice . . . beyond the strict letter of law, and
act in the path of the righteous, doing what is good and
straight according to the perspective of the Lord and
human beings. The Lord guided us to act in a combined
manner that promotes justice, law, mercy and truth. 215
Similarly, he wrote that the Jewish judge and the rabbi, in their
rulings according to the principles of Jewish law, should assume that
it is very important to act in a merciful manner, and implement in the
legal sphere.

212

See Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a; cf. Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 119b.
2 BEN-ZION MEIR HAI UZIEL, HEGYONEY UZIEL 49-50, 63 (1953 & 1954).
214
See 3 BEN-ZION MEIR HAI UZIEL, MISHPETEY UZIEL HOSHEN MISHPAT 1
(Jerusalem, 5760-2000).
215
See id.
213
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Pure kindness. It is an act of mercy that is the result of
thought [about the desirable outcome] . . . and this leads
to the adoption of the policy which is beyond then strict
letter of law . . . “He is merciful -you also should be
merciful. He is gracious- you also should be gracious.”
. . . You should create an essence of life, in your internal
world, and a reality of mercy and pardon, avoid anger,
and attempt to be holy. The Lord is merciful in his
rulings [concerning the fate of human beings],
pardoning when he judges, pious when he implements
his power, the Lord of judgment mercy and truth. . . .
You also should be merciful and gracious, avoid anger,
and the implementation of mercy and compassion
should be your dominant choice. . . . [You should be]
the imitator of the Lord and an individual who desires
to cling to his ways.216
Similarly, he also stressed that the activity of a Jew should be the
implementation of the directive of the prophet Micah: to “love
kindness.”217 Rabbi Ouziel stressed, in light of the statement of the
prophet Micah, that the rules of law and mercy are highly intertwined
in Jewish law:
The good way in the eyes of man and G-d is based on
two principles . . . “to do [justice in] law and to love
kindness”218. . . performing all of our activities in law
in the spirit of kindness, love and clemency . . . kindness
which emerges from the love of man who was created
in the Image of the Lord, to raise his consciousness to
the heights of his goal in life and the understanding of
his mission . . . Law and love of kindness, combined,
raise the human being from his troubled lowly life and
bring him close to the Lord.219
Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, an influential twentieth-century
rabbi, wrote about the obligation of a Jew to harmonize between the
rules of Jewish law and the demands of an extralegal morality that are

216

HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 106.
See Micah 6, 8.
218
Id.
219
HEGYONEI OUZIEL, supra note 210, at 105-06.
217
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beyond the strict letter of law. 220 He stressed that mere implementation
of the law without an attempt to do what is necessary according to
Jewish values leads to bad results in Jewish courts. Therefore, the
Jewish Sages stated that there is a link between the destruction of the
Temple and a rigid legal judicial system, which does not apply in
judicial proceedings along the merciful path, which is “beyond the
letter of the law.”221
C.

The Development of Jewish Law: From Strict Law
to Mercy

Throughout the generations, Jewish law concerning
punishment has evolved, and there is an evident shift from strict law
to mercy. This change in focus initiated the significant degree of
compassion inherent in the Sages’ interpretations of the biblical texts,
which has caused the biblical rules to be substantially moderated.
Favoring merciful interpretation of the rules of Jewish law, rather than
inflicting severe punishment, is not only evident in the period of the
ancient Jewish Sages addressing many crimes in biblical law. It is also
evident in sources of Jewish law in subsequent generations.
A particularly prominent example of an interpretation with a
high degree value in mercy can be found in the Sages’ non-literal
exegesis of biblical rules pertaining to penalties. One evident
illustration of the growing status of compassion in Jewish punishment
is the Sages’ interpretation of the biblical dictum: “An eye for an
eye.”222 This is interpreted as mandating monetary punishment, rather
than the amputation of a limb. The removal of an organ in the body is
not necessary, and this penalty is converted to a monetary fine. 223
See AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, HALAKHAH VEHALKHIM KE’OSHYOT MUSAR:
HIRHURIM MACHSHAVTIYIM CHINUKHIYIM, ARAKHIM BE-MIVHAN MILHAMAH 13,
21-24 (Jerusalem, 5743-1983).
221
See Concerning the demand to act “beyond the letter of the law.” Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Metzia 30b. In this text, the statement of the Sages is that in the
generation of the destruction of the Temple, the judges implemented the strict law
(lit. the law of the Torah-Biblical law) and did not judge according to the principles
that are lifnim mi-shurat ha-din (“beyond the letter of the law”).
222
Exodus 21, 24.
223
See Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 38a; Bava Kama 83a; 84a; see also Mishneh
Torah, Hovel Umazik 1:2; Maimonides, Guide for Perplexed, 1:44. The scholar
Nisani explained that the gap between biblical law and the law of the Sages in this
sphere is not significant. He claims that in biblical law, only in the case of a murderer
220
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Conviction for some crimes in the Bible entails the punishment
of lashes. The merciful interpretation of the Sages is evident in the
biblical statement concerning lashes: “Lest your brother be humiliated
before your eyes.”224 The Sages stated that when courts understand
that lashes are an inappropriate form of punishment, since it is unduly
harsh and causes unjustified humiliation of the sinner, they should
decide to abandon this path. 225 Before lashes are administered, the
court should evaluate the sinner and decide how many lashes the sinner
can absorb without entailing undesirable involuntary discharges from
his body, which would cause humiliation or degradation.226 If the
court sentences an offender to lashes, and the offender who is being
flogged “soils himself either by urine or feces, he is exempt [from
further punishment of lashes].”227 Later, in the medieval period, in
appropriate circumstances, rabbis who acted as Jewish judges adopted
the path of mercy in their rulings and replaced a severe physical
punishment with a milder punishment. 228

is there no exemption from punishment, but when the crime is less severe, then in
biblical law too, the removal of a limb is not always necessary, and often, the
punishment for bodily harm can be converted to a monetary fine. He claims that
there was a gap between the theoretical biblical statement, “an eye for an eye,” and
the reality that, in many cases, enabled implementation of the option to convert the
damage to the eye to a fine. See David Nisani, “Eye for an eye” - An eye or a
monetary fine? On the Status of the Victim in Jewish Criminal Law, 347 WKLY.
PORTION SHEETS, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF JUST., JEWISH L. DIV., 347 EMOR WKLY.
PORTION (5769-2009).
224
Deuteronomy 25, 3; see Responsa of Rashba 5:130-131; see also Responsa of
Rashba 5:239 (concerning the principle that we should avoid the outcome: “Lest your
brother be humiliated before your eyes.”).
225
See Rashi on Makkot 22b, s.v. nitkalkel.
226
See Mishnah Makkot 3:11.
227
Mishnah Makkot 3:14.
228
See the responsum of the fourteenth century Jewish scholar in Spain and North
Africa. See, e.g., Responsa of Rabbi Yitzhak Ben, Sheshet Barafat (Ribash) 281. In
this responsum, he wrote that, at first glance, the punishment of an offender should
be lashes. However, since there are mitigating circumstances, it is preferable not to
act in a manner involving total humiliation of the sinner. Therefore, his conclusion
was that in order to avoid unnecessary shaming of the offender, the appropriate
punishment is to “secretly, and in a modest manner, perform the punishment in the
presence of three or four individuals, and not more than ten individuals, and this
punishment [of lashes] may be mitigated.” Mercy is an evident factor in another
responsum. In an attempt to avoid unnecessary shaming, he raises the possibility of
replacing a physical punishment with a punishment that is less severe. See Responsa
of Ribash 432. In yet another responsum, he took into consideration mitigating
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The shift to mercy in line with the Sages’ interpretation of
biblical law, is especially apparent in ancient sources pertaining to
capital punishment. The death penalty is common in the Bible. 229
Later, however, there has been a substantial moderation of the rules in
the literature of the Sages pertaining to the death penalty; these
changes instituted a de facto abolition of the death penalty, probably
in order to avoid the irreversible outcome of the execution of innocent
individuals as a result of false convictions. The Sanhedrin was defined
as “murderous” if it killed criminals once in seven 230 or in seventy
years.231 Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba go so far as to determine:
“Had we been members of the Sanhedrin, no one would have ever been
executed.”232 In accordance with this statement, an ancient text states
that “[f]orty years before the destruction of the [Second] Temple, the
Sanhedrin was exiled and settled in the storefront.” 233 According to
this tradition, capital punishment was abolished de facto when the
Sanhedrin was moved to another place in Jerusalem since capital
offenses could no longer be adjudicated anywhere after the

circumstances and ruled that the severe punishment, that was appropriate in other
circumstances would be replaced by a fine. See Responsa of Ribash 352. Mercy
was also evident when medieval Ashkenazic rabbis vacated a verdict of lashes due
to concern about excessive punishment. See Hagahot Maimoniyot, Sanhedrin 17:1.
Rabbi Jacob Weil, the fifteenth century rabbi of Franco-German Jewry also
suggested the possibility of fines replacing the regular, physical punishment. See
Responsa of Mahari Weil 147. In the sixteenth century, Rabbi Moses Isserlis, in his
codification of Jewish law of Ashkenazi medieval Jewry, stated the rule that four
gold coins may replace the punishment of lashes. See Hagahot Ha-Rema, Hoshen
Mishpat 2:1.
229
In biblical law, the death penalty is the punishment for several deliberate crimes.
These include blasphemy, cursing parents, striking parents, idolatry, false prophecy
in the name of idolatry, missionizing individuals to be idol worshipers, desecration
of the Sabbath, witchcraft and sorcery, several types of prohibited sexual relations,
adultery involving an engaged women or the daughter of a priest, a rebellious son,
kidnapping and sale of the kidnapped Jew, murder, a rebellious elder, and false
scheming witnesses who seek to kill another human being as a result of their
testimony.
230
See Mishnah Makot 1:10.
231
See id. (discussing the view of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya).
232
Id. This is the view of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba, but Rabban Shimon ben
Gamliel remarks there: “They increase shedders of blood in Israel.” Id.
233
Babylonian Talmud, Avoda Zara 8b; see Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 41a.
Rashi explained that after the removal of the Sanhedrin from its original location –
”Lishkat hagazit” – near the Temple to another location in Jerusalem –”the
storefront” – it did not retain the authority to impose the death penalty. Id.
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Sanhedrin’s dislocation – “lishkat hagazit” – from its original location
near the Temple.
Moreover, even when capital punishment was in force, there
were a number of rules in ancient Jewish law, during the Tannaitic and
Amoraic periods, that were designed to prevent courts from issuing
capital punishment to the greatest extent possible. Consequently, the
implementation of capital punishment in the period of their activity
was uncommon.
Jewish judges first had to warn the witnesses in capital
punishment cases to set before their eyes the value of human life of the
accused human being, who was created in the image of G-d, and think
about his fate if he were to be convicted. 234 After this warning, the
witnesses knew they must be careful, as they may cause irreversible
damage to the innocent. The judges also added another essential
element in this warning to the witnesses to ensure that their testimony
would be fully accurate and to prevent the conviction and execution of
innocent Jews: an explanation of the very detailed cross-examination
process of witnesses in capital punishment. 235 Judges warned
witnesses that the court will subject them to this interrogation and
cross-examination. He will ask them identical questions and compare
their answers in order to ensure, before a conviction, that the testimony
is true.236 This type of cross-examination exposes potentially false
testimonies and any significant discrepancy in the testimony
invalidates the witness’s credibility. 237
Another remarkable element in capital punishment cases is the
requirement to warn the person about to commit a qualifying offence
that, if he does so, his conviction may entail the death penalty. Two
qualified witnesses must warn the possible offender that he is about to
commit an offense, and the offender must verbally acknowledge,
before acting, that he is aware that his possible criminal activity does
not comport with the rules of Jewish law mentioned in this warning,
and commit the criminal act immediately thereafter. 238

234

See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5 (discussing the intimidating speech given to the
witnesses).
235
See id.
236
See id.
237
See Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:1-3.
238
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 40b-41a; Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 12:2; see
also Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:4; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 111b s.v. utzerikhim.
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Other special requirements for capital punishment cases
include a judicial panel of twenty-three judges,239 and when there is a
conviction in capital punishment cases, there must be at least two more
judges voting to convict than to acquit. 240 Additionally, in capital
punishment cases, a verdict that is not merciful to convict should be
issued one day after the closing of proceedings in court and not on the
same day.241 This delay enables the judges to grant due weight to the
option of adoption of a merciful outlook.

See Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4:1 (“What is the difference between civil monetary
cases and capital punishment cases? Civil cases [are tried] by three [judges], but
capital punishment cases [are tried] by twenty-three. The arguments of the judges in
Civil cases may be opened [by arguments] either for acquittal or conviction, while
in capital punishment cases, charges must be opened [by arguments] for acquittal but
may not be opened [by arguments] for conviction. Civil monetary cases may be
decided by a majority of one, either for acquittal or conviction; whereas capital
punishment charges are decided by a majority of one for acquittal, but [at least] a
majority of two for conviction. Decisions regarding civil monetary cases may be
reversed both for acquittal and for conviction; while decisions regarding capital
punishment charges may be reversed for acquittal only but not for conviction.
Regarding civil monetary cases, all [including the rabbinic students, observing the
activity of the Jewish court in this case] may argue for or against the defendant.
Regarding capital punishment charges, anyone [including observing students], may
argue in favor of the accused but not against him. Regarding civil monetary cases,
he who has argued for conviction, may [change his mind and] argue for acquittal,
and he who has argued for acquittal, may argue for conviction; whereas, in capital
punishment charges, one who has argued for conviction may subsequently argue for
acquittal, but one who has argued for acquittal may not argue for conviction. [One
verse states: “And they shall judge the people at all times,” (Exodus 18, 22) thus,
implying that judgement may take place both during daytime and nighttime, another
verse states: “Then it will be on the day that he bequeaths,” (Deuteronomy 21, 16)
thus, limiting judgment to daytime? [Rather], civil monetary cases are tried by day
[meaning that the trial must be initiated by day], but [they may continue into, and be]
concluded, with a ruling, at night. However, [regarding capital punishment charges
the verse states: “Hang them before the sun,” (Numbers 25, 4) indicating that] capital
charges must be tried by day and be concluded by day. Civil monetary cases can be
concluded on the same day, whether for acquittal or conviction; but capital
punishment charges may be concluded on the same day for acquittal but only on the
next day for conviction. Therefore, [capital punishment] trials are not held on Friday
or on the eve of a Festival [since if the verdict is guilty, it must be postponed till the
next day and death sentences may not be executed on Shabbat or on a Festival.
Delaying the execution until Sunday is considered cruel and is not an option].”).
240
See id.
241
See id.
239
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These requirements do not exist in relation to the activity of the
Jewish court in monetary matters.242 In monetary cases, the judicial
panel consists of three judges.243 The decision is issued on a simple
majority of the panel judges. 244 Finally, the decision, whether in favor
of or against a litigant, is issued on the same day, after the end of the
proceedings in court.245
Another restriction on convictions in capital punishment cases
stems from the obligation to judge defendants in all criminal cases as
favorably as possible. This policy is part of a general Jewish trend to
fortify the rights of the accused in Jewish criminal proceedings as
much as possible and protect him or her from irreversible mistakes in
the verdict. If a Jewish court does not judge the defendant in all
criminal cases, especially in capital punishment cases, as favorably as
possible, and does not ensure that criminal proceedings are conducted
in a mild and balanced manner, the unfortunate consequences could be
false convictions and severe punishment of innocent people.
According to the Sages’ interpretation of biblical law, there is an
imperative in Jewish law to judge defendants, in all criminal cases, as
favorably as possible.246
In a situation of uncertainty, the
interpretation of the Jewish individual and Jewish court regarding the
actions of other Jews should be kind and merciful.247 When there is
uncertainty, the court can interpret the facts and situation and reach the
unfavorable conclusion that a Jew committed a crime. It could also
interpret the same facts and situation and reach the favorable
conclusion that he did not commit an offense. When there is a
reasonable doubt in criminal cases, the court must adopt the path of
mercy and not convict the suspect. This is a clear and evident rule also
in the interpretation of medieval Jewish scholars of Jewish law in
Tannaitic and Amoraic sources.248
242

See id.
See id.
244
See id.
245
See id.
246
The Bible requires a Jew who judges or evaluates the activity of another Jew to
act in a just manner. See Leviticus 19, 15.
247
The Sages interpreted this obligation in the Bible as follows: every Jew should
evaluate the activity of his fellow Jew in a manner that is favorable, insofar as
possible. See the statement of Rabbi Joshua ben Perachiah, in Mishnah Avot 1:6.
See also Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 127b.
248
In medieval Jewish literature, the common interpretation concerning the desirable
policy was that when an individual evaluates the activity of another individual, and
243
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In capital punishment cases, the court has a special obligation
to consider whether a favorable interpretation is possible in light of the
circumstances of the case. This obligation is designed to prevent
unjustified convictions and executions. The court should determine if
a verdict in favor of the suspect is possible. In these cases, the court
should allow the presentation of any legal claim of any person, or any
evidence, acting in favor of the defendant, that could lead to the
conclusion that the suspect did not commit the crime. 249 The Mishnah
states:
After this (the cross- examination of the first witness in
capital punishment cases), the second [witness] is
admitted and [also] examined. If his testimonies
correspond, they (the judges) open [the proceedings
with arguments] in favor [of the accused]. If one of the
witnesses says: “I have something to say in his favor”;

there is uncertainty since it is not clear if he acted in the appropriate or inappropriate
manner, he is obligated to be kind and merciful in his judgment of the activity of
another human being, if the circumstances enable this interpretation. See Rashi on
Shevuot 30a, s.v. hevey dan et chaverkh lekhaf zekhut; MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY
TO THE MISHNAH ch. Avot at 1, 6 (Joseph Kapach ed., Jerusalem 5725-1965), and a
similar interpretation of the rule in the ancient texts of the Sages. RABBI MENACHEM
BEN SHLOMO (HAMEIRI), CHIBUR HATESHUVAH 85-86 (Jerusalem, 5736-1976).
With clear words, he determines the essence of the Jewish rules. He wrote that the
interpretation of the obligation to judge other Jews in a just manner is as follows: “A
man should always judge the actions of his fellow man in a favorable manner. When
his actions can be interpreted in two opposing ways, and there is no clear-cut
conclusion, and he could be pious a criminal, there is an obligation to adopt the
favorable conclusion.” BEIT HABEHIRAH, SHEVUOT 30a (Jerusalem, 5721-1961),
s.v. af al pi sherov devarim. He explains that this path of mercy leads to the true
outcome. The favorable attitude is required when there are doubts, and there is no
clear cut conclusion that a person committed a crime. See HIBBUR HATESHUVAH,
MESHIV NEFESH art. 1, 4 at 90 (Jerusalem, 5736-1976).
249
See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1; Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 11:2. In these texts the
obligation of the court to judge in a favorable manner is applicable in capital
punishment cases but not in disputes concerning monetary civil matters. These rules
are not applicable in monetary civil matters since in monetary matters, a court rules
concerning claims of two litigants, on both sides of the barricade. In monetary
disputes, one party will feel the that decision was unjust when there was “mercy”
that led to a “lenient” decision regarding the other party. However, in criminal cases,
society is the “other party” that is accusing the suspect. Therefore, it is possible and
necessary to implement mercy in criminal cases and adopt favorable outlook
regarding the suspect, when this approach is possible.
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or one of the rabbinic students 250 says: “I have an
argument against him,” he is silenced. But if one of the
rabbinic students says: “I have an argument in his
favor,” he is brought up and seated with them, and does
not descend from there all that day. 251 If there is
substance to his argument, he is heard [and does not
descend from there]. And even if he [the accused]
himself says: “I can present an argument for my
acquittal,” he is heard, provided that there is substance
to his statement. If they find him not guilty, he is
acquitted; if not, they postpone the verdict until the
following day. They (the judges) pair off, practicing
moderation in food and abstaining totally from wine the
entire day, and they (each pair) discuss the case [the rest
of the day and] throughout the night. Early the next
morning, they assemble in court. He who favors
acquittal states: “I declared him innocent [yesterday]
and stand by my opinion.” While he who argued in
favor of conviction states: “I declared him guilty and
stand by my opinion.” One who [previously] argued
for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one
who [previously] argued for acquittal, may not reverse
himself and argue for conviction.252
As mentioned above, there are also many other rules in the
Mishnah that are in favor of the accused in capital punishment cases. 253
According to one of these rules, civil monetary cases can be concluded
on the same day, whether for acquittal or conviction.254 However,
capital punishment charges may be concluded on the same day for
acquittal, but only on the next day for conviction.255 In the Babylonian
Talmud, Rabbi Kahana added:

250

See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:3-4.
Even if there is no substance to his argument. If he would be forced to descend,
this would embarrass him and discourage finding arguments in favor of the
defendant.
252
Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:4-5; see also Tosefta Sanhedrin 9:2 (concerning the
presentation of arguments in favor of the accused in capital punishment cases).
253
See Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:1.
254
See id.
255
See id.
251
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If the Sanhedrin unanimously find the accused guilty,
he is acquitted. Why? Jewish law requires that the
sentence in this case must be postponed until the next
day, in order to allow the judges to think about the
details of the case, and maybe they will conclude that
the favorable outlook [of acquittal] is dominant. 256
When the outlook that leads to acquittal is not presented in the panel
of judges, it cannot be anticipated that on the next day, the necessary
majority of judges, in a Jewish court that conducts proceedings in
capital punishment matters, will arrive at the conclusion that the
favorable outlook prevails, and that therefore, the accused should be
acquitted. Additionally, at least one judge should present arguments
in favor of the suspect. When the life of a person is in danger, if all
the judges present their opinions only in the severe, convicting point
of view, the conviction is not valid and capital punishment is not
possible.257 If all judges convict, the more favorable outlook does not
give due weight in the process leading to the decision. In these
circumstances, this panel of judges might be biased against the accused
and will not be able to properly evaluate all the relevant factors in favor

256

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 17a; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 17a, s.v. keyvan
degmireih (“If the judges did not arrive at the favorable conclusion at the first day
[after the end of the trial], they should wait and rule about this case on the next day,
in order that during this delay they will find reasons to rule in favor of the accused.”);
see also Rabbi Meir Halevi Abulafia, Commentary, Yad Ramah al Masechet
Sanhedrin, pt. Saloniki at 17a (5558-1798), s.v. amar Rav Kahanah (“[I]f the judges
could not rule in favor of the accused on the first day they should wait until the next
day, so that maybe the next day one of those who wanted to convict will change his
mind and adopt the point of view of those who wanted to rule in favor of the
accused.”).
257
Rabbi Yehudah Loew Ben Bezalel, known as the Maharal of Prague, explained
that when all the judges in capital punishment cases can see only the point of view
militating for conviction, their decision is invalid since there is an obligation to
examine the favorable option, and it is not in order that all members of a court to
adopt only the severe approach to convict. RABBI YEHUDAH LOEW BEN BEZALEL,
NETZACH YISRAEL ch. 13 at 76-77 (Jerusalem, 5732-1972). Rabbi Eliyahu Desler
explained that according to the Jewish view, investigation of whether the favorable
option is possible in a particular case is essential for a court that attempts to reach
the true conclusion. RABBI ELIYAHU DESLER, MIKHTAV MIELIYAHU 87-88
(Jerusalem, 5743-1983). Therefore, in the appropriate circumstances, the Lord
intervenes and guides the Jewish judges to adopt the path of the merciful verdict, in
favor of the accused in capital punishment cases, in order that their legal decision
will be the “ultimate truth.” Id.
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of the accused. 258 Therefore, in these circumstances, the court’s
decision to convict and pronounce a death sentence is invalid, and the
ruling must be an acquittal.259
In addition, Jewish judges who hate or love a particular litigant
are disqualified. Hatred causes an emotional “distance” from the
litigant; as a result, the judge cannot consider all the aspects in his
258

See RABBI YEHUDAH LOEW BEN BEZALEL, BAER HAGOLAH, HABAER HASHENI
26-27 (Jerusalem, 5732-1972). Rabbi Kahana stated:
If the Sanhedrin unanimously find the accused guilty - he is acquitted'.
Why? Since Jewish law requires that the sentence in this case be
postponed until the next day, in order that the judges think the details of
the case, and maybe they will conclude that the favorable outlook [of
acquittal], prevails.” . . . But, in these circumstances, these judges will not
be able to find out what are the favorable aspects in the future. . . . The
decision to acquit him will be a strange conclusion for them, after all the
judges ruled he should be convicted. Therefore, in these circumstances,
the decision should be an acquittal. . . . Judges are human beings and
therefore there is a requirement that when they wish to convict, they
should wait until the next day, in capital punishment cases where an
execution by mistake is irreversible. . . . When judges see that one judge,
or several judges, are in favor of the accused, they might change their
minds, but when they see that all judges agree to convict, they feel this is
the final decision and do not attempt, in the required manner, to
investigate if there are relevant factors in favor of the accused. They do
not devote the necessary intellectual effort and attempt to find out if there
are these factors, in favor of the accused.

Id.
259

See the explanation of Maimonides in Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 9:1:
When all the judges in the Sanhedrin begin with the conclusion that their
judgment of a case involving capital punishment, should be that the
accused is liable, he is acquitted. There must be at least one judge who
seeks to acquit him and raises claims in the panel of judges on his behalf,
and in these circumstances, he can be convicted, if the majority holds him
liable. Only in these circumstances can he be executed.

Id. A similar explanation appears in Rabbi Menachem ben Shelomo Hameiri’s
fourteenth century commentary on the Talmud:
When all the judges in the Sanhedrin, in capital punishment cases, begin
with the conclusion that the accused is liable, this does not lead to the
imposition of the death penalty, since the law requires that in capital
punishment cases the decision will be made on the next day if they did not
decide to acquit on the first day, in order to enable the judges to think of
reasons that may lead to a ruling in favor of the accused. But all the judges
begin with the conclusion that the accused is liable, they will not be able
to find in the future reasons in favor of the accused that can lead to
acquittal. In these circumstances, the accused is not sentenced to death
until there are judges who change their minds and rule in favor of the
accused, although the majority of judges decided to convict him.

Beit Habehirah Sanhedrin 17a, s.v. Sanhedrin shepatchu.
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favor.260 Meanwhile, love causes a “friendly inclination” of emotional
closeness with the litigant, and the judge might therefore grant
unnecessary weight to aspects favoring the litigant.261 Rabbi Papa
stated:
A man should not act as judge either for one whom he
loves or for one whom he hates; for no man can see all
the elements that could lead to the determination of the
guilt of whom he loves or all the favorable factors that
could lead to the acquittal of one whom he hates. 262
Maimonides defines the scope of “love” and “hatred” in this
context:
A judge may not adjudicate the case of a friend. This
applies even if the person is not a member of his
wedding party or one of his more intimate
companions.263 Similarly, he may not adjudicate the
case of one he hates. This applies even if the person is
not his enemy and one whose misfortune he seeks. 264
Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally
in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges. If the judge

260

See Rashi on Sanhedrin 29a, s.v. chad ledayan.
See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 29a.
262
Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 105b.
263
The definition of the scope of “love” in the writings of Maimonides is wider than
the narrow scope in the example in the Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5: “A friend or an
enemy [is disqualified]. ‘A friend’ [means] one’s best man [during the period of his
friend’s wedding].” Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5; see Mishnah Bava Batra 9:4; see also
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 29a (“By ‘friend’ one’s groomsman is meant. How
long [is he regarded as a groomsman]? -Rabbi Abba stated, in Rabbi Jeremiah’s
name: ‘The whole period of seven days of marriage feast.’ The Rabbis stated, in the
name of Rav: ‘After the first day [he no longer is regarded as such].)’” The
Tosaphists claimed that the basic law only disqualifies one’s groomsman and in other
cases, included in the definition of “love” in Maimonides, the disqualification is only
a stringency, beyond what is required by law. Tosaphot Ketubot, 105b, s.v. Lo.
264
The scope of “hatred” in the writings of Maimonides is wider than the narrow
scope in the example, concerning the disqualification of a witness as a result of
hatred. Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:5. ‘“An enemy’ [means] any man who is not on
speaking terms with this person for three days.” Id.
261
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does not know either of them and is not familiar with
their deeds, this is the fairest judgment that could be. 265
Some medieval Jewish scholars stressed that this rule is necessary in
order to achieve the objective of Jewish rulings - din emet la’amito.266
It ensures that the decision of a Jewish court or rabbi is not tainted as
a result of bias. The court or rabbi should act in a completely neutral
manner. Since absolute impartiality is essential to decision-making,
Jewish judges and rabbis should not reach decisions as a result of their
love or hatred of parties whose requests or actions are being evaluated
by their decisions. Sometimes, a harsh or mild verdict is the result of
strong negative or positive feelings toward an individual; however, this
will be avoided when we ensure that a decision of a rabbi or Jewish
court will not be tainted as a result of bias. 267
The Sages also applied to capital punishment law the
commandment in the Bible, “Love your fellow as yourself,”268 which
Rabbi Akiba defines as “a great rule of the Torah (biblical Jewish
law).”269 In light of this commandment, the ancient Sages wrote that
a capital sentence must be executed in the least cruel and humiliating
way, limiting the pain and indignity of the individual sentenced to the
death penalty: “Choose him a fine death.” 270 Therefore, capital
punishment must not be administered in a prolonged manner; rather,

265

Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 23:6; see also RABBI YITZCHAK ABUHAV MENORAT
HAMAOR ch.17 (“Love of Friends”) (Vilnius 1883) Rabbi Abuhav stressed that one
of the more important characteristics of love of friends is the activity of favorable
judgment of what other human beings do. This behavior prevents unnecessary
disputes between human beings and is the foundation of peaceful relationships
between individuals. He stressed that there are several good outcomes of this
behavior. One important result of this good behavior is love and unity between
friends. Id. at 309-10.
266
Rabbi Joseph Karo stresses that the attempt to reach the goal of din emet la-amito
requires that the Jewish judge act with absolute impartiality. Rabbi Joseph Karo,
Commentary, Beit Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 1, s.v. ve-zehu . . . kol ha-dan din emet
le-amitto.
267
See 2 ELIAV SHOCHETMAN, SEDER HADIN BEBEYT HADIN HARABANI 574-76
(5771-2011) (concerning the rules in Jewish law that were enacted in order to prevent
bias in legal proceedings in Jewish law).
268
Leviticus 19, 18.
269
See Genesis Rabba 24:7; Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 9:4; Babylonian Talmud,
Shabbat 31a.
270
See Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 75a, Ketubot 37b, Sanhedrin 45a, Sanhedrin
52b; see also Rashi on Sanhedrin 45a, s.v. mita yafa.
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the execution should be quick, in order to reduce the suffering of the
executed human being as much as possible. 271
Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Chayut explained that the principle
concerning “fine death” expresses a general rule in Jewish law of the
ancient Sages. Jewish law will never impose an obligation or
punishment that may result in severe and negative effects upon a
Jewish individual. The rule “love your fellow as yourself” is
applicable in the sphere of capital punishment to ensure that the death
penalty should be a “fine death.” When the Sages had doubts as to the
appropriateness of a punishment, they acted in light of this general
rule. In turn, the Sages’ actions guided the Jewish court, in all aspects
of its activity, to implement the lenient and less severe punishment.
This is due to the general dominant goal of Jewish law: implementation
of “compassion and mercy” in all the activities of Jews in the world.272
IV.

CONCLUSION

According to many Jewish sources that present the point of
view of influential rabbis and Jewish scholars, certain considerations
that can lead to severe sentences – including the need to combat crime,
deter potential criminals, and ensure that convicted criminals do not
commit additional crimes – are only part of the wide range of
important considerations in the Jewish legal system. These should
include the significant weight accorded in a Jewish court to mitigating
circumstances and the desire to adopt the path of mercy of the Lord.
The ultimate truth in the legal system can be achieved only when the
important perspective of a merciful approach exercised through
compassion, which is implemented by the Creator of the World, is
given its due consideration and leads the court to aspire to act beyond
the strict letter of law.
Therefore, it is fitting that Jewish courts and rabbis, before
making their decisions, should engage in an in-depth consideration of
whether the harsh or the merciful outcomes is possible and desirable.
This determination of what is the “ideal” in Jewish law (i.e., beyond
the letter of law) is the legal policy that is necessary to undertake in
the decisions of a Jewish court or in the halakhic decisions of a rabbi.
In Judaism, mercy is not only the process of matching the sentence of
271
272

See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 45a.
See ZVI HIRSCH CHAYUT, MEVO HATALMUD ch. 16 at 36 (Lemberg, 5688-1928).
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an individual to the particular context of his or her act. The Jewish
judge should take a deliberate approach, employing his intellect and
emotions, on the path leading toward a merciful ruling, insofar as
possible. He should analyze all the ramifications of his decisions and
strike a suitable balance between different, and sometimes conflicting,
relevant facts, outlooks and values, in order to reach the ultimate truth.
This decision-making process is more appropriate and reflects greater
moral integrity of the legal process and judgment than the current
process in American law. The alternative process, involving a cold
and distanced evaluation of facts and circumstances, lacks this
necessary moral inspiration embraced by the Jewish law system. The
guidelines for the Jewish judge are that he must exercise moderation
in the legal process and focus on trying to prevent the suffering of
innocent individuals. He should ensure that he is not denying the rights
and defense of litigants, who should be granted proper rights and
adequate legal defense, and is not punishing offenders in a strict,
unjustified manner that is not necessary in light of all the relevant
circumstances. This pattern of activity is clearly the embodiment of
mercy in the legal system.
Acting in a lenient manner towards the offender, beyond the
strict letter of the law, is indeed a challenge to the rule of law and leads,
conceptually, to disorder and chaos. However, the appropriate
combination of mercy and law, in cases where this integration is
necessary and desirable, should lead to the desirable goal: a just and
equitable legal process. According to the Jewish outlook, a court
verdict that broadcasts a message of compassion, consideration, and
conciliation may be essential for the existence of normal society more
than a verdict which expresses an attitude of “let the law cut through
the mountain.”273 Mercy in courts and relationships between human
beings are important. The outcome of the implementation of the
merciful perspective is a good relationship among human beings.
They live in harmony and peace in a world that can “survive.”274
Therefore the Jewish judge is required to employ his ethics and
conscience and seek to go beyond the laws and rules dictated by the
strict letter of the law.
This focus in Jewish law and Jewish thought upon the desire to
act in a merciful manner can be a source for comparison and
273
274

See supra note 106 and accompanying text (concerning this outlook).
See supra note 125.
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inspiration in criminal law in modern legal systems, such as the
American legal system. It is relevant in many aspects of criminal law,
including the nomination of judges and juries, legal policy regarding
criminal judgment, and decisions issuing often very severe criminal
punishment that involve capital punishment and three-strikes law
convictions.
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